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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the interpretation and implementation of energy security in the 
European context concerning the Nord Stream pipeline. Nord Stream has been, and still 
is, highly debated across Europe because of its enormous opportunities for Europe—it 
will give Europe access to the largest known reserves of gas worldwide—and because of 
the risks involved. Nord Stream provides Russia with an option to gain an advantageous 
position over Europe concerning energy policies, thus raising the fears of Nord Stream‘s 
critics that Russia might use this leverage to promote its own position in political areas 
other than energy. 
It is, therefore, essential to analyze the opportunities and risks associated with 
Nord Stream for Europe, and to give thought for future mechanisms of European energy 
security that will assist in maximizing opportunities and minimizing risks. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The European Union consists of 27 states with a total population of approximately 
500 million people.1 The assumption is that the overall population of the EU will decline 
within the next decades, while its need for energy will not. Europe‘s natural energy 
resources are declining.2 Already, the EU is importing about 54% of its energy (gas and 
oil),3 which makes the EU one of the largest importers of fossil energy resources. 
Even if one of the EU goals is to develop more efficient alternative energy 
sources (wind, solar, etc.), none of these sources—no matter how promising they are—
has developed to a stage on which EU can rely as a major source of energy. Given the 
EU‘s dependence on foreign imports of fossil energy, the construction of the Nord 
Stream pipeline between Russia and the EU is the latest attempt to secure its energy 
supply. Establishing an additional major supply line, however, is only one aspect of 
improving energy security. In a worst-case scenario, the dependence on a major supply 
line like the Nord Stream pipeline may actually decrease energy security. It may also 
provide the supplier, in this case Russia, with the leverage to influence European decision 
making in policy areas that are well beyond the scope of energy security. 
This situation leads to the following research question: What impact does the 
Nord Stream pipeline have on European energy security? 
 
                                                 
1Eurostat, Eurostat - Tables. Graphs and Maps Interface (TGM) table: Total population, 11 March 
2011, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1
&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (accessed 6 April 2011). 
2 European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Europe's Energy Position: 
Present & Future, Market Observatory (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2008), 19. 
3 Ibid., 16. 
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To answer this question, it is necessary to define the terminology of energy 
security and how it is reflected in European energy security policies and strategies. 
Energy security is much more than just having secured the income of foreign 
fossil energy resources by signing contracts and building the infrastructure. Contracts, 
reliability of partners, the possibility of corruption, and the protection of the necessary 
infrastructure are also part of energy security. So, energy security, just as security and 
defense policies, must become a pillar of the whole European security concept that 
shelters us as people and our way of life. The demand for a common European energy 
policy is inevitable. 
Once the dimensions of energy security have been analyzed in general, the Nord 
Stream pipeline project will be examined to determine the related opportunities and risks 
for Europe. This will lead to an assessment to what extent and in which way the Nord 
Stream pipeline impacts European energy security. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Worldwide energy demand is rising with declining fossil resources. In addition, 
the distribution of energy will dramatically change within the next twenty years, making 
it even more difficult for individual Western nations, and Europe as a whole, to compete 
against China, Russia and India for energy resources.  Even if the European Union is 
willing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020 and increase the overall 
share of renewables by 20% by 2020,4 fossil fuels will still be the main source of energy 
in the next twenty to thirty years. Europe‘s fossil resources, however, are declining and 
the dependence on imported resources is increasing. Therefore, it is very important to 
analyze and understand how the European Union plans to secure its energy supply in the 
future.  
Russia is known to have the largest proven reserves of natural gas. And, it lies in 
close proximity to Europe. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the EU is trying to 
                                                 
4  European Commission, 20 20 by 2020 – Europe's climate change opportunity (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, 2008). 
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gain access to Russia‘s gas fields to secure its future energy demands. Both players, the 
EU and Russia, profit from this arrangement, since Europe needs to guarantee its security 
of supply, whereas Russia is dependent on Europe‘s security of demand. Overall, the 
direct linkage between Russia and the EU through the Nord Stream pipeline could be a 
win-win situation. 
But Russia is also known to use its energy resources as a political weapon. And it 
is uncertain whether Russia is going to use Europe‘s energy dependence to influence 
political opinions and goals. The Nord Stream pipeline might increase Russia‘s leverage 
to influence European decision-making in policy areas well beyond energy security. The 
European Union‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is still immature, and it 
remains ambiguous if CFSP is capable to meet the risks that are involved with the 
construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Energy security has become a very complex 
issue and a coherent and comprehensive approach is needed to address the many inherent 
challenges. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Energy is a scarce resource. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
that the overall demand for energy will increase by 45% by 2030, and the fuel mix will 
still consist of 80% fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and gas.5 There are two main reasons 
for the rising demand for energy: population growth and economic growth, mainly in 
non-OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) states and 
regions such as Africa, China, and India. In fact, the economic growth rate of OECD 
states is expected to decline from 3% to 2% by 2030, according to the IEA. Still, OECD 
states and non-OECD states will demand more energy in the future, but at different rates. 
It is expected that the demand of non-OECD states will increase by 84%, whereas the 
demand of OECD states will increase by ―only‖ 14% by 2035.6 
                                                 
5  International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008: Executive Summary (Paris: International 
Energy Agency, 2008). 
6  U.S. Energy Information Administration, ―International Energy Outlook 2010,‖  July 2010, 
www.eia.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. 
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Europe is expected to have a future decrease in fossil energy demand due to 
European and national policies, future requirements on energy efficiency, and the 
promoting of renewables as a source of energy. The above numbers will still have a 
major impact on European energy politics, since the amount of imported energy will 
continue to increase.7 The expected massive shift of today‘s existing energy trade routes 
towards China and India might create severe problems for Europe in guaranteeing its 
energy supply in the future. 
The European Union is not a nation. It is a supranational organization consisting 
of 27 member states, each with different interests, cultures, and values. Decisions on 
foreign policies and strategies (including defense policies) are made unanimously. This 
slows down the decision-making process since it is difficult to find a consensus between 
all member states on important issues.8 Presently, energy security is mainly dealt with the 
European Commission‘s Directorate-General for Energy. The importance of energy 
security has also been recognized by the CFSP; however, all strategic questions 
concerning energy and energy security are dealt with by the European Commission. So 
far, energy security has not evolved as a major topic for CFSP. However, the 
coordination and cooperation between these two powerful EU institutions is critical to 
properly address energy security in the future. 
Several achievements have been made so far, like the European parliament‘s 
acceptance of a common energy policy in 2007,9 but the Council of the European Union 
did not approve a common energy policy. The promised goal of the EU to increase the 
share of renewables in the fuel mix to up to 20% by 2020 also contributes to reducing the 
risk of energy dependence. In addition, the ―Green Paper‖ of the European Commission 
from 2006 already provides the EU with ―a European Strategy for Sustainable, 
                                                 
7  European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Europe„s Energy Position: 
Present & Future. 
8 The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty took more than two years. 
9  Chatham House, Transparency in Russia and Eurasia and Energy Security in Europe, Seminar 
Summary (London: Chatham House (www.chathamhouse.org.uk), 2008). 
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Competitive and Secure Energy.‖10 Still, 56% of the energy demand will need to be 
imported; therefore, the EU has to ensure these imports through increased diversification 
of supply lines and securing large energy resources outside the EU for its convenience. 
The construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, with its determined goal to ensure energy 
flow from Russia directly towards the EU, is a step in this direction. 
The Nord Stream pipeline is a pipeline project that is built to supply the EU with 
Russian gas. The Nord Stream AG is a joint venture of several European energy 
enterprises—BASF (15.5%), E.ON (15.5%), Gasunie (9%), and GDF Suez (9%)—and 
one Russian energy company, Gazprom (51%).11 Since the pipeline is independent of any 
transit states, no further trading agreements had to be made. The success of the project 
depends on the reliability of Russia and Gazprom as the energy exporters and producers, 
and the EU and their enterprises as the importers and consumers. Incidents like the 
disruption of energy flow from Russia to the EU due to the Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006 
will not be repeated because Nord Stream avoids transient countries. 
Russia is known to use energy as a political weapon. The Ukrainian gas crisis and 
the Russian-Georgian conflict are proof of this fact. Needing to receive 30% of its oil and 
gas consumption, the EU is highly dependent on Russia.12 The fact that Gazprom holds 
51% of the shares of Nord Stream, and is extremely well connected to Moscow and the 
Kremlin, underscores this issue.13 If Russia is planning on using energy as a political tool 
against the EU, it has the power to do so. 
The political and governmental setup of the EU is both a curse and a blessing. The 
EU sees itself as a civilian normative power, and puts great emphasis on this unique fact. 
The EU has a great amount of civilian assets available to assist in foreign crisis 
management. Furthermore, the EU is a great economic power and a highly reliable 
trading partner, but can also use its economic power in terms of financial aid and 
                                                 
10  European Commission, Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy, report (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2006). 
11  Nord Stream AG, 2010, www.nord-stream.com (accessed 22 Jul 2010). 
12  Chatham House, Transparency in Russia and Eurasia and Energy Security in Europe. 
13 Victor Zubkov is the Chairman of the Gazprom Board of Directors and the First Deputy Prime 
Minister of the Russian Federation (www.gazprom.com) 
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investments or, if needed, sanctions to promote its values and interests. When it comes to 
the EU as a coercive power, the EU is still in its developing stages. The European 
Security Strategy proves that threats and risks for the stability of the EU have been 
identified, but that there is still no consensus about how to effectively deal with the 
identified threats and challenges. Energy security is mentioned only once in the European 
Security Strategy 2003, and then more as a sideline.14  In addition, the power of the EU is 
limited, because most member states are not willing to give up sovereignty in favor of the 
EU in areas of great national importance. This includes foreign policies—an area where 
the EU could make a great step forward by implementing the provisions of the Lisbon 
treaty—and energy security. 
It is important for European nations to realize that future efforts concerning 
energy security must regard the EU as a whole, and should not be dominated by national 
interests. This coherent approach will enlarge energy security for all member states and 
will assist in facing possible negative aspects arising out of specific energy projects such 
as the Nord Stream pipeline. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis follows the format of a single case study. It analyses aspects of energy 
security in Europe and then focuses on the Nord Stream pipeline, its opportunities and 
risks, and its impact on European energy security. The Nord Stream pipeline project has 
been chosen because it is considered highly controversial in Europe and it highlights 
some of the major challenges of energy security.  
The main reason for this controversial discussion is, on the one side, the great 
opportunities the pipeline provides for the European Union, giving it direct access to the 
largest known gas reserves in the European area, and therefore securing the import of 
natural gas for at least twenty to thirty years.  On the other side is the great dependency 
on Russia, which is feared to be an unreliable energy-trading partner and one that would 
 
                                                 
14  The European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy, 
intergovernmental document (The European Union, 2003). 
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possibly use energy as a political tool to influence European politics. Also, the setup of 
the Nord Stream consortium, with Gazprom being the largest stockholder, has raised the 
concerns of the pipeline critics. 
It is not the goal of this thesis to question the overall setup of European energy 
security because it includes a lot more than just one pipeline. But the possible impact of 
the Nord Stream pipeline on European energy security, in combination with an enlarged 
dependency on Russia, justifies the focus on the project and requires an assessment of 
how European energy security and its key principles are impacted by the Nord Stream 
pipeline project, and what the consequences for the European energy security system 
could be. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The main objective of this paper is to determine the dependency of the EU on 
Russia and whether the EU is prepared, equipped and willing to use adequate means to 
reduce the risk of the Nord Stream pipeline being used as an energy weapon. To do so, it 
is necessary to identify to what extent the energy security principles—diversification, 
resilience, information, reality of integration, globalization, protection of the supply chain 
—are implemented in European strategies and to measure these principles against the 
Nord Stream pipeline project, as an example of European-Russian energy relations. 
The thesis is divided into several chapters. Chapter II is used to provide the reader 
with an overview of energy security, its key principles and its relevance. Further on, the 
implementation and interpretation of energy security within the European context is 
highlighted, with comparisons to other institutions and nations, and their definition, 
interpretation and acceptance of energy security. 
The third chapter provides an overview of the external and internal European 
energy market, the role of depicted EU member states and their market behavior, and the 
role of the EU organs to guide and influence European energy politics. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the Nord Stream pipeline, its setup, the players 
behind the scenes and its opportunities and risks for Europe. Within the presentation of 
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the Nord Stream pipeline, the role and impact of Russian politics concerning the Nord 
Stream pipeline is also highlighted. This is necessary to gain a better understanding of the 
likelihood of Russian politics to directly intervene in the energy market. 
The fifth chapter of the paper consists of an analysis what impact the Nord Stream 
pipeline imposes on the overall aspect of European energy security. It is important to 
assess the opportunities and risks of the pipeline project and to what extent they are 
reflected by the interpretation and implementation of energy security key principles 
within the European energy security context. 
The information gained from the analysis is used in the sixth chapter to draw 
conclusions regarding the impact of the Nord Stream pipeline on European energy 
security, and what work areas need to be addressed by the European Union to increase 
energy security. 
 9 
II. EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY 
A. THE GLOBAL ENERGY MARKET 
The global energy market will change dramatically within the next two decades. It 
is estimated by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that the world energy demand will 
increase by 45% by 2030 and that 80% of the worldwide consumption of energy still 
consists of fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. The demand of oil is expected to 
rise at a rate of 1% per year, whereas the overall share of oil will drop from 34% today to 
30% by 2030. Natural gas will rise by 1.8% per year to a total share of the energy mix of 
22%.15 
The largest-growing sector in the energy mix is believed to be energy generated 
out of renewable technologies such as solar, wind, geothermal, tide and wave. Their 
estimate of growth lies at 7.2% per year, leading to a total share of the energy mix from 
1% today to 4% in 2030.16 
There are two main reasons for the rising demand for future energy. The first one 
is worldwide population growth. According to the IEA, the world population is estimated 
at 8.2 billion in 2030. Population will grow the most in Africa, China, and India. North 
America and Europe‘s growth will be much smaller; in some areas, such as Russia, 
Germany and Italy, the overall population is expected to decline.17 It is interesting to note 
that the fastest rate of population growth is not allocated to the wealthiest states of today, 
but with emerging economies like China and India.18 
The second reason for the growing demand of energy is economic growth. 
Despite a decline of the economic growth rate of OECD states, non-OECD states are 
expected to have an increase in economic growth from 2.5% to 4.8%. China‘s economic 
                                                 
15 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008: Executive Summary, 4. 
16 Ibid., 5. 
17 Ibid., 63. 
18 Ibid., 63. 
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growth will decline from 8.8% today to, still very impressive, 6.1% in 2030. India, 
Africa, and Brazil will continue to rise (6.4% for India).19 
The worldwide rate of growth of population and economic power are valid 
arguments to explain the growing demand for energy. What is most interesting, however, 
is which regions grow the most. Today, energy consumption between OECD states and 
non-OECD states is nearly equal. But the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
believes that by 2035 the energy consumption of non-OECD states will grow by 84%, 
whereas OECD member states will have an increase of only 14%. This has influence on 
the global energy market and the world economy since, in addition to the rising 
worldwide predicted energy demand, an overall decline of natural resources is already 
present. In the future, fewer energy resources will be available against a growing demand. 
On its own, this is already a great threat to the worldwide energy market.20 Combined 
with the shift of greater energy demand of non-OECD states, and the need to establish 
new energy markets, refineries and trade lines, energy security will be one of the major 
topics now and in the future, so a thorough picture of energy security and its impact is 
essential. 
B. ENERGY SECURITY 
The terminology of energy security is not new. It has always been present 
alongside energy demand and supply, but it did not always get the attention it requires. 
Starting from the industrial revolution, where energy was only available to the industry 
sector and a few wealthy households, the implicitness of energy became more and more 
present since energy was made available to a growing number of societies. Today, seen 
from the first-world perspective, it is unthinkable of not having electricity and hot water 
in everyone‘s household and not having the required transportation means for everyday 
mobility. And the growing implicitness of energy will continue to grow in every corner of 
 
                                                 
19 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 64–66. Table 1.3 illustrates the economic 
growth by refering to Real GDP. 
20  Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Energy Security for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook 
(Washington D.C.: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Datat, 2009), 2. 
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the world. But what is energy security? Is it just the market equilibrium between energy 
supply and demand, or is there a little bit more to it? Several authors have tried to answer 
this question in the past. 
1. Electricity and Transportation 
According to Luft and Korin, each ―country‘s definition of energy security has 
much to do with their own particular energy situation and how they view their 
vulnerabilities to energy supply disruptions.‖21 They further argue that the distinction 
between the two primary energy usage sectors, electricity and transportation, is a 
necessity to define the particular energy situation. Most vulnerable are those countries 
that need to depend on energy imports in both usage sectors, such as the European Union 
(EU), which is discussed in more detail later on. The only dependence on resource 
imports for power generation gives at least the opportunity for diversification, since the 
fuel mix in the electricity sector consists of natural gas, coal, renewables, and nuclear 
power, whereas oil is the dominant resource for transportation. Diversification is one 
important key principle in terms of energy security. Through diversification, in regards to 
different producers and different resources, the possibility of disruption of energy supply 
can be reduced.22 
2. Producers and Consumers 
Besides the distinction between the two primary usage sectors, in defining a 
particular country‘s energy situation, it is also important to highlight a country‘s position 
in the energy market. Is it, in general, an energy consuming or an energy-producing 
country? A traditional producer views energy security more as ―security of demand,‖ 
whereas the consumer thinks of energy security in terms of ―security of supply,‖ as 
mentioned by Luft and Korin and Yergin. 
It is the producer‘s short-term goal to sell as much energy resources as possible at 
the highest possible price. In the long run, however, the producer has to find the balance 
                                                 
21Luft and Korin, Energy Security for the 21st Century, 6. 
22Daniel Yergin,  Ensuring Energy Security, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (Mar 2006): 69. 
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between maximizing its revenue and being recognized as a responsible and fair 
supplier.23 Several conditions are required to ensure this balance. 
At first, only a stable market can guarantee stable prices. Too intense price 
fluctuations are not in the best interest of either consumers or producers. But a stable 
market can only be guaranteed when the conditions are given. The existence of an energy 
producing monopoly will not guarantee a stable market. Russia, for example, has been 
known in the past to try to ―gain primacy over the main pipelines and market channels.‖24 
According to Luft and Korin, Russia‘s attack on Georgia in 2008 was simply to increase 
Russian control over two strategic important gas pipelines.25 Russia is already the largest 
energy exporter to the EU and controls large shares of the market, but is it in Russia‘s 
interests to create an energy monopoly? This issue is highlighted in this thesis, in a closer 
look at Russia and its interpretation of energy security. 
Second, a stable energy market must be existent and functioning. A functioning 
market means a self-regulating market—a market where the price is established through 
supply and demand. Yergin recommends the stability and existence of a global energy 
market, when he refers to  ―only one oil market,‖ and indicates ―for all consumers, 
security resides in the stability of this market.‖26 Moran and Russel state that ―strong 
states are prepared to trust their energy security to the workings of international markets‖ 
and this is to be recognized as a ―testimony to their faith in the efficiency of those 
markets.‖27 The necessity of a stable market is also recognized by Kalicki and Goldwyn. 
But, up to now, the global energy market is split. The existing global oil market— where 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the main player (78% of 
the worlds proven oil reserves and 40% of global oil production)—allows OPEC to 
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influence the oil price to a large extent28—but a global gas market is not yet fully 
developed.29 So this will continue to be a challenge for energy security. 
Third, to be recognized as a reliable and fair supplier, it is essential for the 
producer to invest in the future of securing the consumer‘s demand and be able to fulfill 
that demand. Since worldwide demand continues to rise, the logical consequence would 
be that supply would have to rise as well. Some believe that this will be an issue in the 
near future. This is not because the world is running out of energy, but because of a lack 
of investments. There are yet-to-be-discovered reserves of energy resources that could 
supply the global demand for the next fifty years. The problem is that these resources are 
more difficult to exploit today. This includes the exploitation of fossil resources out of 
harsh, mankind-hostile regions such as the deep sea, or turning towards exploitation 
technologies that were dismissed before due to high costs such as oil sands. The oil sector 
is the energy sector that is threatened most by the rising exploitation costs. Another 
sidelining factor of rising exploitation costs is that the number of states holding the 
majority of fossil resources will decline as well as the number of companies that are able 
to afford the large amount of investments needed to exploit fossil resources in the future. 
So, in the near future, a rising demand, a small amount of energy producing countries and 
a small amount of multi-national companies will set up the fossil energy market. This 
future set up will not make life easier in the energy market. 
Let‘s turn to the consumer‘s side. As has been stated above, the traditional 
energy-consuming country thinks of energy security in terms of security of supply. It is in 
the nation‘s interest to ensure that the demand for energy needed will always be met. For 
countries that are totally energy independent, this is not a great challenge, but it will be 
for countries that depend on energy in either one or both usage sectors. For these 
countries, it is very important to rely on stable market conditions, fair prices and trading 
partners, and secure energy trade lines. With all these variables, it will prove to be a 
major challenge for energy-dependent countries. How can energy-consuming countries 
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secure their energy income? Do ―guidelines‖ exist that assist in controlling the variables 
an energy-dependent country has to take into account to secure the demanded energy 
income? 
Luft and Korin (Luft and Korin 2009) identified two principles that consumers 
need to be aware of concerning securing energy demand—diversification of energy 
supplies and the creation of mechanisms to withstand sudden supply disruptions, such as 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD.30 Both organizations have been 
founded to assist consuming countries in sharing their energy resources in times of need 
and as a counterbalance in the global energy market, in contrast to the organizations of 
energy producing countries such as OPEC.31 Kalicki and Goldwyn have also found 
diversification important as well as the necessary requirement of new political and 
economic strategies and coalition building.32 In the introduction of their book, Moran and 
Russel put great emphasis on the stability of markets and the trust in markets. They raise 
the question: What needs to be done when market strategies fail? They conclude that it 
will come to a militarization of energy security—seizure of energy assets, denial of entry 
to energy assets to rivals, and military protection of the supply chain including the whole 
energy creating process, etc.33 It can be argued whether this is a radical perspective or 
not, but all three above-mentioned sources see the need for more political involvement to 
stabilize the energy market or be prepared if the stabilization process fails. This includes 
military means and power projection, even it has not been addressed precisely by all 
authors. 
3. Key Principles of Energy Security 
Yergin points out that the current energy security system was set up as an answer 
to the industrialized nations due to the oil crisis of 1973. At that time, energy-consuming 
countries were made aware of how dependent they were on oil imports from Arabian oil- 
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exporting states by using energy dependence as a political weapon. As one consequence, 
the IEA was founded to assist industrialized countries to respond to sudden disruptions of 
energy income. Other lessons learned were the necessity for the creation of strategic 
stockpiles, energy conservation and the coordinated emergency sharing of supplies.34 He 
argues that several principles must be present to maintain energy security in the long run. 
These principles will now be discussed, in detail, since they include most of the above-
mentioned requirements, but will follow along an abstract outline, which makes these 
principles easier to understand. 
a. Diversification 
Diversification, as has already been pointed out several times, is the first 
key principle to ensure energy security in the long run. Seen from the consumer‘s 
perspective, diversification can be divided into two parts—diversification of energy 
resources and of energy suppliers.35 Depending on the composition of a country‘s fuel 
mix—for example, the overall energy fuel mix of the EU consists of oil (37%), gas 
(24%), solid fuels (18%), nuclear (14%), and renewables (7%)36—it is easier for a 
country to react to disruptions in energy income if the fuel mix is set up in a way that 
allows the country to rely on other energy resources for a short period of time in order to 
fulfill the demand for energy by its citizens or, in the worst case, allow strategically 
important industries to continue to produce. Nations who depend on only one source of 
energy—such as the United States within their transportation sector37—do not have this 
opportunity. They need to rely on the second alternative, the diversification of suppliers. 
Today the U.S. is 60% dependent upon oil imports, where most of the oil is coming from 
the Middle East.38 Oil income disruption could hurt the U.S. significantly. As a 
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consequence, the U.S. has great incentives to either enlarge the diversification of 
suppliers or to bind the limited amount of suppliers to the U.S. by other means, which 
could include military assets, such as military power projection, in exchange for 
preferential market treatment.39 The EU is no more independent than the U.S. In fact, 
54% of its energy resources need to be imported into the EU.40 
b. Resilience 
The second key principle is resilience. Every energy-dependent nation 
needs to integrate some kind of buffer within its energy security strategy. This could 
include ―strategic reserves, backup supplies of equipment, adequate storage facilities 
along the supply chain, and the stockpiling of critical parts for electric power production 
and distribution,‖41 but is not limited to these. Resilience is a difficult task to fulfill since 
it includes so many different aspects, such as sudden disruptions due to natural disasters, 
terrorist attacks or political embargos. How can the whole supply chain be secured if it is 
unknown when, how, and to what extent the supply chain will be disrupted? The rise of 
possible terrorist attacks against energy-based targets is already a present threat and the 
massive destruction of Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005 proved the 
underestimation of natural disasters and their impact on the energy sector.42 The 
uncertainty of such events is the greatest challenge in terms of resilience. To reduce 
uncertainty to some extent, it is necessary to have, besides reactive instruments, 
preventive instruments of resilience. If the exact route of a hurricane could be anticipated 
well in advance, the reactive instruments could be used more efficiently. If the time and 
place of a terrorist attack is known, then instruments can be made available to prevent the 
attack. Even if great achievements have already been made, uncertainty remains the 
largest variable. This continues to be a great challenge for the future. 
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c. Information 
Third, the importance of information needs to be mentioned.43 Information 
is essential and connects all principles. Information reduces the risks of investments. The 
sharing of information between producers and consumers helps to stabilize markets and 
prices. Gaining an information advantage assists in securing the supply chain. 
Information in terms of technological advantage can also contribute to the exploitation of 
today‘s unreachable energy resources—such as deep sea drilling—and make the 
exploitation profitable. Forums need to be present where such information can be shared 
like the IEA and the OECD. One main function of both organizations is the exchange of 
information between members. But information itself is a highly valued factor and is not 
free. Nobody is willing to pass on information without receiving something of similar 
value in exchange. This does not say that the IEA is nothing more but an information 
trade market; its pure existence already provides its members with knowledge and power, 
tools to prevent or react to energy crises. But these can only be provided when the 
member states are willing to share their information in exchange for a secured energy 
income. It can always be reduced to a classic win-win situation. And the exchange of 
information is the basis of every win-win situation. 
d. Reality of Integration 
Besides importance of information, it is also important to recognize the 
reality of integration.44 No country in the world can be self-sustaining. International trade 
is important for the growth of the economy and that is a dependent variable to ensure the 
wealth of society. This applies to the energy market as well. Without a sufficient amount 
of resources, the energy demands of today‘s society can never be met. As Luft and Korin 
stated, ―[Transportation] energy makes the world go around.‖45 Therefore, it is essential 
for countries to realize that they will be dependent upon other nations in terms of energy, 
either as a producer to secure the energy demand, as a consumer with regards to sufficient 
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supply and stable prices, or as a nation that seems to be energy independent but has to 
rely on foreign technology to exploit or further process energy resources. To some extent, 
they all are connected and depend on each other. This further stresses the point of 
integration in the energy market. Stable market conditions and stable prices can only be 
guaranteed through an overall accepted market. Oil, as a good, is only traded on one 
market, the oil market. It could be argued whether the oil market, in its present setup, 
could be considered a stable market, but it is a functioning market. It just could use a few 
more competitors to stabilize the price and reduce its elasticity. And this important fact 
has to be realized by all consumers and producers. 
e. Globalization of Energy Security 
Closely connected to integration is the recognition of the globalization of 
the energy security system as another principle.46 The separation of the participants of the 
energy market into two camps—IEA vs. OPEC; OECD vs. non-OECD; consumers vs. 
producers—will have to be reconsidered. As mentioned in the first paragraph, the global 
energy market, including the overall demand of energy, is rising. Whereas the rise of 
demand in OECD countries will not increase by a large extent, countries like China, 
India, and Brazil are held accountable for a significant portion of the overall rise in 
demand.  China and India, especially, with their large populations and their emerging 
economies will become very important players, if they are not already, in the energy 
market. It would be foolish to deny the fact that these countries will control large portions 
of the energy market in the near future. Now is the time to integrate them into the energy 
market and make them part of the energy security system. Otherwise, China, India, and 
maybe Brazil might create their own energy security system and their own energy 
market, which would lead to an unstable energy market with unstable prices and an out- 
dated energy security system. 
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f. Protection of the Supply Chain 
Last, there is the rising need to protect the entire supply chain.47 This has 
become an increasing need in the last few years, mainly to the rising threat of terrorism. 
According to Kalicki and Goldwyn, ―the internal stability of U.S. suppliers … and their 
vulnerability to acts of terrorism are critical factors for U.S. energy and national 
security.‖48 Even if this statement reflects the U.S. perspective, it also has a global 
meaning. Luft and Korin identified terrorism as a large threat to energy security, 
especially for the power generation and distribution sector.49 This can be underlined by 
Koknar, who identified electric power grids and the gas and oil infrastructure as highly 
vulnerable.50 Since it is often the terrorist‘s intention to force a government to agree to 
terrorists‘ interests, targets are often chosen for their strong impact on society. Disrupting 
the supply chain, by destroying an electric power grid, could have such an impact. Again, 
there is uncertainty as to when and where an attack could happen. As a preventive 
instrument, information is needed, but if this fails it is important to have reactive 
instruments, such as a diverse energy distribution network or backup supply systems. 
Moran and Russel have also identified the threat of terrorism, but they do 
not believe that a terrorist attack against energy-based targets would have the same 
impact as the attacks from September 11. They argue that those attacks had a high 
psychological effect on people that influenced them to drastically change their travel 
plans, which took the airline industry years to recover. They believe that the energy 
security system—they are referring to the U.S. energy security system—is so diverse and 
resilient that the effect of an attack against the energy sector would be difficult to 
compare. According to these authors, people would never reconsider taking other means 
of transportations to work or to heat their homes.51 This can be argued, because up until 
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now, people have never been forced to rethink their energy consumption behavior due to 
a terrorist attack. This has only been achieved through governmental implementations of 
environmental laws or rising gas prices. But because it did not yet happen, does not mean 
it cannot happen. Uncertainty again makes it difficult to react or use preventive measures. 
The need for protection of the supply chain should not just be limited to the possibility of 
a terrorist attack, even if it is the largest threat. 
The protection of the supply chain will also be necessary along the 
transportation waterways, especially their choke points: the Straits of Malacca, the Strait 
of Hormuz, and the Suez Canal, to name only a few, as pointed out by Nincic.52 The 
possibility of terrorist attacks at sea is also mentioned, but there is another threat present: 
piracy. The rise of piracy along the coast of Somalia in the past few years, and the rapid 
actions taken by the U.S., NATO, and the EU by sending warships into the area to secure 
safe ship passage, illustrates how much weight industrial nations have put on the threat of 
piracy. The importance of protecting the supply chain has also been proven in times of 
conflict. First, the supply chain can be attacked as a military target to weaken the enemy 
and its power as the Germans did in World War II when they attacked supply ships from 
the U.S. with goods for England. Only the massive protection of these supply convoys, 
using warships, made it possible to keep the supply chain running. Second, the denial of 
energy can be and has been used as a political weapon. In these cases, it is mandatory to 
protect the supply chain either via military means or via sanctions. No matter what, the 
supply chain cannot be allowed to break. And, as a last option, military assets can and 
will be used by nations if all other options have failed, especially the market, as perhaps 
the most important tool of energy security. 
Since fossil energy resources are scarce and demand is rising, the 
probability of energy becoming a main reason for future conflicts is high. This does not 
mean that wars in the future will be only about energy, but wars have been fought over 
energy resources and will continue to be so. That is why energy security is so vital. It is 
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not just about the possibility of future wars and their reasons, but the probability of war 
should be taken into account. The global energy market will not help solve all energy 
issues, but it should be considered a powerful tool in energy security and, therefore, be 
supported. Energy Security is not just a topic for energy companies and energy lobbyists, 
but also for society, and especially for nations and their governments. ―Energy security is 
a public good,‖53 so it is the nation‘s responsibility to face these challenges and ensure 
energy security by all means—civilian, politically, economically, and militarily.  
The topic of energy security is vast, as can be seen in this compromised 
outline. But it is important to realize the relevance of energy security and understand the 
principles and how they interact. To sum up, the distinction between the two primary 
usage sectors—power generation and transportation—is important to identify how 
vulnerable nations really are in terms of energy disruption. The distinction between 
consumers and producers is relevant because, otherwise, no clear picture can be drawn 
about each nation‘s specific interest and demand for energy security. The presentation of 
the principles of energy security—diversification, resilience, information, integration, 
globalization, and protection of the supply chain—points out the great dimension of 
energy security and the possibilities nations have to ensure it. 
C. ENERGY SECURITY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
1. The United Kingdom 
Between the three largest economies of the European Union—Germany, France, 
and the UK—the UK has the least dependency on imported fossil fuels due to its natural 
resources in the North Sea. These resources, however, are declining; peak production has 
been reached and the UK is aware of this. 
Within the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom since 2008, several 
security challenges have been identified, including competition for energy. This relates to 
its declining resources and that the UK will very soon have to compete with other 
                                                 
53  Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy & Security, 4. 
 22 
nations, worldwide, for the remaining natural energy resources. China and India are 
specifically mentioned as growing markets, with an increasing demand for energy. 
According to the UK‘s NSS, this growing demand—global energy demand will be 50% 
higher in 2030 than it is today—will increase the potential for conflict. ―Along with 
climate change and water stress, it [competition for energy] is one of the biggest potential 
drivers of the breakdown of the rules-based international system and the re-emergence of 
major inter-state conflict, as well as increasing regional tensions and instability.‖54 
Already, some nations, like China and Russia, have made energy supply a major topic for 
their respective foreign policies. Similar to the United States, the UK understood the 
connection between climate change and energy policy. It is also, therefore, the goal of the 
UK to tackle climate change by reducing CO2 emissions and increase energy efficiency. 
To increase energy security, the UK speaks of an ―integrated strategy.‖ It is 
designed to ensure energy supplies, reduce the UK‘s vulnerability to security shocks, 
reduce tensions from competition for energy resources, and to tackle climate change.55 
Great emphasis is put on the improvement of the competitive energy market, especially 
the creation of a global gas market. This will have to include Russia, who the largest gas 
producer and accountable for half of Europe‘s gas imports to ensure secure and reliable 
imports of gas.56 This is not surprising, since currently 40% of the UK‘s domestic energy 
production is derived from gas.57 With its own declining resources, the UK sees a need to 
strengthen its energy position by competing for energy resources. This includes the 
diversification of supply, reliability of trading nations and investments. Ten billion GBP 
are to be invested in modernizing its gas import and storage facilities. In addition, 
investment in nuclear power plants is encouraged to increase energy independency.58 
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The UK‘s NSS shows that the UK is aware of the importance of energy security 
and has managed to put it into the right context within the UK‘s overall national security 
strategy. 
2. France 
The French White Paper on defense and national security, in comparison to the 
NSS of the UK, is a more defense and military-oriented strategy. It focuses more on 
present and future military responsibilities and capabilities in order to strengthen French 
national security. But the White paper also tries to integrate domestic and foreign 
policies, as well as civilian capabilities.59 
Energy Security is not addressed, in particular, in the White Paper, but  is in 
context with several important key findings and new security parameters that have been 
identified. The security of the energy supply has been identified as a priority area for 
protecting European citizens, and an integral part of France‘s European ambition, but no 
future guidelines can be derived from this statement. The French White Paper on defense 
and national security puts more emphasis on Europe‘s future military capabilities.60 
What has been realized is the impact of energy as a risk to evolve as a threat to 
French national security. Future conflicts are predicted to involve energy and the 
competition for resources. In addition, energy security is one of the factors where the 
traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policies vanishes. The global 
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terrorism. Because it influences domestic as well as foreign security policies, 
comprehensive and integrated strategies are required to meet these challenges.61 
France identified its main area of interest along one major strategic axis—the arc 
of crisis from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. According to the White Paper, this axis is 
characterized by regional instability, inter-state and non-state violence and the high 
concentration of energy resources.62 By specifically mentioning the high concentration of 
energy resources along the main strategic axis, the importance of the Middle East for 
France, concerning energy, is made clear. The White Paper, however, does not include 
any specific strategies on how to tackle the challenges of energy security and how energy 
security will contribute to national security. It is unclear why France did not include such 
strategies in their White Paper, which overall is a very detailed report on French defense 
strategies at present and in the future. It might be due to the fact that France derives 
nearly 80% of its electricity from nuclear power plants.63 This puts France in a more 
comfortable position than other European nations in the realm of energy dependency. 
3. Germany 
Energy security is an important topic for Germany as Germany‘s dependency on 
imported fossil fuels (61.3%) is nearly three times as large as the UK‘s dependency.64 In 
addition, Germany‘s climate change goals and the highly debated shutdown of all nuclear 
power plants by 2022, contribute to Germany‘s acceptance of the importance of energy 
security. To be able to ensure the needed base load of electricity in the future, nuclear 
power plant providers have been granted an extension of 15 years by the government,65 a 
decision that is opposed to the beliefs of a large portion of Germany‘s population. After 
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the nuclear catastrophe in Japan, all political decisions concerning the extension granted 
to nuclear power plants in Germany are on hold again. 
The German White Paper of 2006 reflects Germany‘s view of security policies 
and the future of the Armed Forces. Contrary to the security strategies of the USA, the 
UK and France, the German White Paper is not written and published by the office of the 
head of government [chancellor], but by the Ministry of Defense. 
In conjunction with globalization, terrorism, proliferation, etc., energy security 
has been identified as a risk for German security policies and has been implemented in 
the strategic context. A secure and sustainable energy supply is of strategic importance, 
and Germany is aware of the fact that new global challenges, risks and opportunities have 
to be met. A worldwide increase on energy demands and climate protection are some of 
the risks, whereas the ―necessity in developing countries to improve access to energy‖ 
opens economic opportunities for these countries and Germany.66 
Germany‘s growing dependency on imported fossil fuels is one of the challenges 
that have to be met. This can only be achieved through intensive cooperation with 
producing, transiting and consuming states, including Russia, as Germany‘s primary 
source for fossil fuels, the Middle East with its rich energy sources alongside its political, 
religious and cultural conflicts that have to be solved, and India and China as the two 
fastest-growing economies and largest populations in the world.67 Both nations are 
important trading partners for Germany and their increasing energy demands will 
drastically change the worldwide distribution of energy resources. They will be partners 
and competitors at the same time. Germany has realized that the energy topics of 
tomorrow are not matters of national concern, but have to be engaged and solved at a 
global level. What can be solved on a national basis are the political and economic 
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decisions on a diverse fuel mix and suppliers, renewable energy, an increase in energy 
efficiency and the protection of the energy infrastructure.68 
The importance of energy security and its global dimension has been properly 
addressed and integrated in the strategic context of Germany‘s White Paper on Security 
Policy. 
4. Russia 
With the end of the cold war, the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving behind multiple 
states that emerged from the Soviet Union as independent states. Russia, especially 
Moscow, was the centre of power for the Soviet Union, which leads to the Russian 
perception of being the successor of the Soviet Union. The sudden realization that the 
United States and the Western states won the cold war and that the United States is the 
only remaining superpower, combined with a devastating economy, are examples of the 
problems Russia has and has to cope with. The Russian Federation was left in an identity 
crisis and was desperately searching for ways to restore its significance as a superpower. 
The possession of nuclear weapons and its permanent membership as a veto power within 
the United Nations Security Council assisted Russia in restoring its claim of being 
recognized as a superpower. 
Speaking of its economy, the first years after the end of the cold war were very 
difficult for the Russian state and its people. Based on the GDP growth rate data from the 
World Bank, the Russian economy declined up to 14.5% in 1992 and 12.6% in 1994.69 
The Russian economy did not take off until 1999, and since then, the Russian economy 
has risen at a rate between 5% and 10% annually, which is a remarkable rise in GDP 
growth compared to highly industrialized nations. As for the whole world economy, the 
year 2009 resulted in a decline Russia‘s GDP of 7.4% due to the global financial crisis. 
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Nevertheless, Russia, as one of the BRIC-nations,70 will emerge from this crisis a 
winner because it has something to offer that a great number of countries are interested in 
—large fossil energy resources. Russia holds 43,30 trillion cubic meters of natural gas 
reserves, which are the world‘s largest proven gas reserves. In addition, Russia is the 
seventh largest occupant of proven oil reserves (79 billion barrels). Russia is the largest 
worldwide exporter of natural gas and the second largest exporter of oil.71 Not 
surprisingly, the focus on energy security is of great importance for Russia‘s economy 
and wealth and, therefore, an issue of national security. 
The most recent paper dealing with the matter of Russia‘s national security is the 
Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) published in 2008. According to a report from the Center 
for Eastern Geopolitical Studies, the new FPC emphasizes an ―increasing importance of 
energy in international affairs.‖ Specifically, the rising competition for energy resources 
and its potential for future conflicts is mentioned.72 A report from the Caucasian Review 
of International Affairs mentions that Russia lays its focus on regions like the Arctic, the 
Caspian Sea and Siberia and that Russia will ―participate in the struggle for the 
exploitation of regions rich in resources and the control of the transportation routes‖ and 
that ―Russia desires to be a country that plays a leading part in energy, serving both 
economic and political goals.‖73 
The large proven reserves of natural resources allow Russia to become a major 
player concerning energy on the international scene. If not dependent already, large parts 
of the world will become dependent on Russian energy resources in the near future. In 
addition, Russia will be a counterbalance to the politically unstable region of the Middle 
East, which promotes Russia‘s role in worldwide energy politics. The fact that Russia is 
not a member of OPEC underlines this. 
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D. ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Energy security is not just a topic that is only important to the European Union, 
but also of great national interest to the member states. So far, several documents and 
policies have been published on a European level dealing with the matter of energy 
security.  Specifically mentioned are the Green Paper and additional reports based on the 
Green Paper, the European Security Strategy and the Treaty of the European Union. The 
Green Paper74 was written by the European Commission and includes strategies for the 
European Union on how to properly address energy issues in the future. The European 
Security Strategy,75 published by Javier Solana in 2003, during his term in office as the 
Secretary General and High Representative of the European Union, is so far the only 
paper that identifies key threats to the European Union and how these key threats need to 
be addressed. Since 2003, no revised versions of the European Security Strategy have 
been published. The Treaty of the European Union was signed in 1992 in Maastricht by 
the heads of state or government. Since then, the Treaty of the European Union has been 
updated with several additional treaties. The last version of the Treaty of the European 
Union is known as the Lisbon Treaty. It was signed in 2007, and after ratification by the 
member states, was implemented in December 2009.76 
Before the documents are described in more detail, it is important to have a closer 
look at the setup of the EU as a legal body, in order to understand the connectivity 
between the different decision-making institutions and the boundaries and problems 
associated with energy security policies, foreign policies and national interests. 
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1. Interpretation of Energy Security 
The EU is not a nation but a supranational organization. What makes the EU 
unique is that it combines institutions within the organization that can overrule national 
interests and laws—different from other intergovernmental organizations like NATO, 
where all decisions are made unanimous in the North Atlantic Council (NAC)—but also 
includes the European Council, consisting of the head of state or government from every 
member state, where decisions are made also unanimous to maintain national 
sovereignty. 
Even if the EU is not a nation, its constructional setup is similar to democratic 
states. The legislature of the EU consists of two chambers, the European parliament and 
the Council of the European Union. These two chambers discuss, vote and adopt 
European laws proposed by the European commission. Laws passed through both 
chambers are binding for member states. In some cases, national laws have to be adjusted 
accordingly. The parliament consists of 736 members and is elected by the citizens of the 
European Union for five years.77 The Council of the European Union consists of the 
national ministers of the member states and they are, therefore, not electable through a 
European election, but through the national elections held in each member state 
individually. Depending on the subject being discussed, the Council has different 
configurations. With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the amount of 
possible configurations rose to ten. Depending on the discussed subject, not only the 
configuration, but also the decision-making process will vary—single-majority voting, 
qualified-majority voting or unanimity.78 
The judiciary is represented by the EU‘s Court of Justice. It is the duty of the 
Court of Justice to assure that European laws are implied in all European states the same 
way. On the executive side, there is the European Commission. It is comparable to the 
cabinet of most nations. Every one of the 27 member states appoints one commissioner. 
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The Commission proposes new laws and assures their proper application in the EU. It is 
setup out of several departments, such as environment, finance, internal market, and 
energy, just to name a few. In contrast to the Council of the European Union, within the 
parliament and the commission, all decisions are based on either single-majority or 
qualified-majority voting. 
Energy security is mainly part of the working order of the European Commission 
for energy. The Council of the European Union, consisting of the national ministers of 
energy, is mainly involved in the decision-making processes concerning European energy 
work areas, but are not limited to only the energy questions being addressed in this 
specific configuration. Whenever necessary, it is possible to discuss energy questions 
within other configurations, such as environmental issues related to energy production 
within the Environment Council, or when issues of energy security need to be discussed 
in the Foreign Affairs Council due to its international dimension. 
The presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council is held by the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). In fact, the Foreign Affairs 
Council is the only institution of the Council of the European Union that is not chaired by 
the respective minister of the member state, which currently holds the rotating presidency 
of the European Union. At the same time, the HR is also Vice President of the European 
Commission. This change was introduced through the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009 to increase the impact of European foreign policies.79 The main 
working area of the Foreign Affairs Council is the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CSFP). This includes diplomatic and economic tools, humanitarian aid, sanctions, nation 
building, police missions and military missions. As the operational arm of CFSP, the 
European security and defense policy—within the Lisbon treaty renamed the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)—was introduced. It is the goal of CSDP to provide 
the EU with military and civilian capabilities to act in crisis management and ―ensure 
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peace and security in troubled regions.‖80 The EU does have its own civilian capabilities 
and a military staff, but further police and military capabilities need to be provided by the 
member states.  Most decisions made with regards to foreign affairs are based on 
unanimity. 
The Lisbon Treaty is the most recent version of the Treaties of the European 
Union. As with all treaties following the Lisbon Treaty, it is an amendment to the original 
version from 1992, known as the Maastricht Treaty, which is the founding treaty of the 
European Union. No previous treaties are regarded as founding treaties of the Union, but 
they built important milestones that enabled European nations to help evolve into the 
European Union. In fact, energy matters played a very important part in the first 
European treaty, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
signed in 1951 and expired in 2002. The main purpose of the ECSC was ―to integrate two 
key sectors of their [European] economies to create a community … [whose] purpose was 
to replace conflict with cooperation and antagonism with prosperity.‖81 At that time, coal 
was the main driver of energy production in Europe. Energy played an important part in 
European politics right from the beginning. 
With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, several changes have been made 
and added to the Treaty of the European Union, including energy politics, which have 
been raised to a greater political level. Energy, as a topic on the European level, has been 
added as Title XX Article 176 A to the Treaty of the European Union. It highlights the 
importance of energy and includes four key interests for European energy politics; (1) a 
functioning energy market, (2) the assurance of security of supply, (3) the promotion of 
energy efficiency and energy saving and (4) the promotion of an interconnectivity in 
energy networks.82 This is to be achieved through a ―spirit of solidarity between member 
states‖ but is not to ―affect a Member State‘s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
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general structure of its energy supply.‖83 The Lisbon Treaty truly shows the importance 
of energy politics on a European level, and its acceptance. But the treaty does not show 
any interconnections between the new office of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and energy politics (HR), especially energy security. 
Energy politics remain within the working order of the European Commission. 
Concerning European security, the European Security Strategy (ESS) needs to be 
named. Written in 2003 under Javier Solana, the ESS identifies key threats to the 
European Union and how to address these threats. Identified key threats are terrorism, 
proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. Energy dependence 
has been identified as a global challenge, with the EU being the largest importer of oil 
and gas.84 There is no strategy for how energy dependence is to be reduced or addressed 
and no further comments are found regarding energy security within the security strategy. 
This has been realized and is now integrated into in the ―Report on the Implementation of 
the European Security Strategy‖85 since 2008. Due to the high dependence of the EU on 
imported fossil fuels and their limited allocation within areas with high threat potential, 
the EU must adopt ―an energy policy which combines external and internal 
dimensions.‖86 According to the report, the internal dimension includes a unified energy 
market, greater interconnectivity and ―attention to the most isolated countries and crisis 
mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.‖87 Externally, the report favors 
greater diversification, good governance and investments in source countries. In addition, 
transit routes, promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency are also valuable 
contributions to the European Security Strategy. Since the report does not replace the 
Security Strategy, but contributes to it, maybe a new European Security Strategy will be 
published in the near future to address Europe‘s vision of ―a secure Europe in a better 
world‖ in more detail. 
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The Green Paper, published by the European Commission in 2006, can be 
regarded as the most important European energy strategy paper. Six priority areas have 
been identified by the Commission as essential to achieve the goal of ―sustainable, 
competitive, and secure energy.‖88 The main points that can be drawn out of these areas 
are an internal energy market, security of supply, solidarity between member states, 
diversification, tackling climate change, promoting new technologies and a coherent 
external energy policy. 
These priorities come very close to the key principles of energy security— 
diversification, resilience, information, reality of integration, globalization of energy 
security, protection of the supply chain.89 Even if the terminology of energy security is 
used very rarely in the Green Paper, by integrating the key principles of energy security, 
the whole paper relates to European energy security. 
Through the completion of an internal electricity market, the European Union 
wishes to secure and create jobs in the European energy sector and contribute to a 
security of supply based on the interconnectivity of national networks and solidarity 
between member states. This alone reflects resilience, information, and reality of 
integration as key principles. Diversification of the fuel mix and the supply chain is 
essential to the EU to enlarge the security of supply and decrease the negative effects of a 
high dependence in the EU on fossil fuels imported from a limited number of source 
countries. Concerned with climate change and promoting new technologies, the EU has 
set itself ambitious goals. An additional report based on the Green Paper was published 
by the Commission in 2008: ―20 20 by 2020—Europe‘s climate change opportunity.‖ It 
addresses two key targets—the reduction of 20% of all greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 
and a 20% share of the renewables of the European fuel mix.90 To fulfill these goals the 
EU has to increase energy efficiency, decrease the import of fossil fuels, since fossil fuels 
are accountable for the biggest part of greenhouse gas emissions, and invest in new CO2-
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low energy generation facilities and new technologies and replace ageing infrastructure.91 
The last priority area mentioned in the Green Paper is the adoption of a ―coherent 
external energy policy.‖ 
Europe needs a coherent external policy to enable Europe to play a more 
effective international role in tackling common problems with energy 
partners worldwide. A coherent external policy is essential to deliver 
sustainable, competitive and secure energy… It would enable the EU to 
speak with one voice. 92 
This contributes to the request of an external dimension of energy security within 
the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. The necessary 
interconnectivity of a nation‘s energy networks and of energy security between the 
Commission, the office of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the Foreign Affairs Council have been identified by the 
Union as a must to give European energy security an external dimension. ―The EU‘s 
external energy policy is dependent upon the progress with internal policies and, in 
particular, the creation of the internal market for energy.‖93 
Reflecting the above-mentioned institutions of the European Union, their working 
areas and tools, the developed strategies, reports and papers, it can be stated that energy 
politics and energy security are part of the main agenda of the European Union. The 
importance of energy security has been realized and integrated into strategies to properly 
address energy security. The European Union already has the working bodies with 
identified working areas, consisting of people derived from the member states, tasked 
with working for the European Union and its people. But how is energy security 
implemented within the European context? 
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2. Implementation of Energy Security 
The rising dependency of the European Union on fossil fuels is the main reason 
for the rising importance of energy security within the Union. In fact, Denmark is the 
only member state of the Union that is energy independent. On the other hand, Cyprus, 
Malta, and Luxembourg are nearly 100% energy dependent. Germany has a dependency 
rate of 61% whereas France is a little better with 51%. Of the four big nations of the EU, 
the United Kingdom has the lowest energy dependency, at 21%, due to oil and gas 
reserves in the North Sea. But natural resources are declining, so energy security will be 
and already is an issue in the UK. The overall dependency of the European Union on 
natural resources is 54%.94 
It is important to mention that energy security is not only about the dependency 
on foreign natural resources. Energy security is also about diversification of the fuel mix, 
resilience and information. The security of supply through foreign imports is only one 
dimension of energy security, but it is the most influential external dimension. It 
demonstrates the direct connection between energy politics at home and foreign affairs. 
Energy security will not be enlarged by only paying attention to the security of supply, 
but the denial of its importance can cause energy supply disruptions with severe 
consequences. This was clearly seen during the 2008–2009 Ukrainian gas crisis, where 
several Central and Eastern European countries ―found themselves suffering through a 
cold winter with greatly reduced access to heating fuel.‖95 For the importance of 
European energy security, this crisis has been an ―early wake up call that exposed 
Europe‘s energy security vulnerability to both intended and unintended supply 
disruptions.‖96 
Nevertheless, despite all the strategies and policy suggestions written by the EU 
and worldwide energy specialists, and despite all the institutions already available to the 
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EU dealing with energy matters, the European Union still lacks a common energy 
security policy. The main reason for this is the nations‘ unwillingness to comply with 
binding laws on a European level concerning energy politics. This is only true to some 
extent. In 2007, the member states agreed on an ―Energy Policy for Europe.‖ Within this 
policy, several goals,, like the increase of renewable energy and energy efficiency and the 
decrease of CO2 emissions, have been formulated, some of them legally binding. But 
member states still continue with divergent national energy policies and ―remain reluctant 
to cede national control over energy markets.‖97 As was written in a CRS Report from 
2008 concerning the EU‘s energy security challenges, ― energy policy remains … the 
responsibility of the member states‖ and most decisions regarding long-term investments, 
infrastructure, fuel mix ―continue to be made at the national level by individual member 
states.‖98 
Kevin Rosner, the editor of the Journal of Energy Security, named one of his 
articles ―The European Union: On Energy, Disunity,‖ which is similar to the official 
motto of the EU: ―United in diversity.‖ Rosner states, ―no state was or is willing to have 
Brussels [the EU] dictate the form and type of energy consumed‖ and ―national 
governments largely retain the right of determining their own energy future.‖99 When the 
EU wants to emphasize its strength through the diversity of its member states, regarding 
energy security, this diversity is not favorable. This fact can be underlined by comparing 
the fuel mix of member states. France, for example, has a great belief in nuclear power, 
which accounts for 85% of its national energy production. Renewables account for a 
share of 13%, whereas oil and gas have a diminishing share at 2%.100 Germany‘s 
domestic energy production consists of solid fuels (43%), nuclear (32%), gas (11%), 
renewables (10%) and oil (4%).101 These numbers already show the differences between 
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the member states regarding energy and their priorities, and the differences are also the 
base of debates throughout Europe. Regarding the goals of the European Union to fulfill 
its ―20 20 by 2020‖ targets, France is in a better position then Germany. Nuclear power 
generation is currently the only energy source that can provide clean, CO2 efficient 
energy as a base load, if the danger associated with nuclear power and the unsolved 
problem of nuclear waste disposal are not considered. In addition, through its great 
dependence on nuclear energy production, France is nearly energy independent in terms 
of domestic power generation. Germany, who is committed to fulfill the ―20 20 by 2020‖ 
goals, like France, has decided to shut off all of their nuclear power plants by 2022. This 
decision has been revised by the government, and the nuclear power industry has been 
given an extension of 15 years.102 As mentioned above, this decision has been put on 
hold since the nuclear catastrophe in Japan. Following this decision, there was a 
controversy in the German parliament and protest actions by Greenpeace against what is 
currently the largest party in the German parliament, the CDU or Christian Democratic 
Union.103 How is the European Union going to unite its member states concerning energy 
when the two largest economies of the European Union have such diverse opinions and 
interests in energy matters? And how will the EU be able to create a common energy 
security policy with an external dimension when its member states cannot agree on 
matters of the internal dimension of energy security, including the extension of a 
European internal energy market and network? 
The Security & Defence Agenda104 hosted a dinner in May 2010 where Europe‘s 
energy security situation was discussed in conjunction with an overall question: Is 
Europe‘s energy security policy a reality or an ambition? One of the main points 
mentioned was that the EU should continue to follow along its track of adopting the six 
priority areas as defined in the Green paper. However, it was also mentioned that ―the EU 
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lacks genuine political will to reach a decision together and take common actions‖ and 
―national interest take precedence over common actions in the EU, a fact that is rooted in 
the fear that common actions would not provide the same benefits as individual 
actions.‖105 Further on ―the lack of a single external representative from the EU creates a 
sense of incoherence on the world stage.‖106 ―We [the EU] need to speak with one voice 
in external energy affairs.‖107 Even if the European Union officially has its external voice 
concerning foreign affairs, the office currently held by Lady Catherine Ashton, her power 
regarding energy politics is limited. As mentioned above, the main reason for the lack of 
a common energy security policy is the nations‘ unwillingness to work together.. Energy 
security is too important for each nation, making it difficult to distribute to any level 
beyond national authorities. Giving the EU the authority to formulate a valid energy 
security policy, binding for all member states, would mean giving up national power 
concerning energy. Energy security is regarded in most nations a matter of national 
security, just like defense. Concerning defense, the EU has been able to develop a 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) over the last ten years, embedded in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Still, each nation decides on its own 
whether a CSDP mission is to take place and to what extent military or civilian personnel 
will be contributed.  All CSDP missions, as mentioned above, are bound to unanimity 
within the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council. 
Despite all the negative aspects concerning CSDP, at least the EU and its member 
states were able to agree on the implementation of a common security and defense policy. 
Concerning energy security, this has not been achieved. Energy security, up to this point, 
is not part of the working order of CFSP within the Foreign Affairs Council, which 
makes it difficult to give Europe ―one voice‖ concerning energy security, and a forum 
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where the external dimension of energy security can properly be addressed. This forum is 
needed as most European natural resources imports are derived from areas of great 
instability or where the reliability remains uncertain.108 
Title XX Article 176 A of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that ―[such 
measures] shall not affect a Member State‘s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply.‖109 The only commitment stated in the Lisbon 
Treaty concerning energy is a ―spirit of solidarity.‖110 The question that arises is the 
value of this spirit of solidarity between European Union member states when their 
energy interests are so divergent. Today, every member state has the right to agree on 
bilateral agreements to strengthen its own energy position, even if this might be 
disastrous for other European member states.111 The deep-sea oil drilling off the coast of 
Angola by the French oil company, Total, is just one example of these bilateral 
agreements. No other European nation has currently entered the very profitable market of 
deep sea drilling in Angola. This is good for France and its citizens since it allows Total 
and the French government to control the development of oil prices in France, but it 
weakens the position of other European nations and the European Union. The ongoing 
discussion about the environmental aspects of deep sea drilling, after the incident in the 
Gulf of Mexico, is just one factor where the European Union has no word. As has been 
pointed out previously, environmental issues are important to the European Union in 
terms of energy politics. But Angola is not Europe and French national interests are 
valued higher than European interests. Another example, which will be highlighted in 
more detail later on (within this thesis), is the erection of the Nord Stream pipeline 
through the Baltic Sea. Overall costs of the pipeline are estimated at 7.4 Billion EUR, not 
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including operational and maintenance costs.112 It was highly debated that the erection of 
the pipeline through the territory of the Baltic States and Poland would have been cheaper 
and easier to maintain, but Russia and Germany preferred and selected the bilateral 
solution. Since both the Baltic States and Poland are members of the European Union, the 
pipeline project not only weakens their position towards the resources giant, Russia, but 
also within the European Union. It also hampers further development of an integrated 
internal energy market in Europe. 
The EU has realized the great importance of energy security and developed an 
impressive set of policies and strategies that could contribute to European energy 
security. Nevertheless, the unwillingness of its member states makes it nearly impossible 
for the EU to act accordingly. Therefore, it remains uncertain how long this unfortunate 
situation regarding European energy security will remain. The real power within the EU 
does not lie within its institutions, but with its member states, and as long as national 
interests are of a higher priority than European interests, European energy security will be 
difficult to accomplish. 
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III. THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET 
At the beginning of Part II of this paper, the overall development of the global 
energy market was described. It discussed the rising global demand for energy that is 
expected, mainly due to population and economic growth in non-OECD states like China, 
India, Brazil, and Africa as a region. 
Nineteen of twenty-seven EU member states are members of the OECD. The EU 
has expressed its willingness to reduce greenhouse emissions by 20%, increase the share 
of renewables in the fuel mix to 20%, and increase overall energy efficiency by the year 
2020.113 Whether these numbers can be met by 2020 remains questionable. Under 
today‘s conditions, the energy demand in the EU will, in fact, rise and dependency on 
fossil fuels will increase as well.  
The European energy market is made up of two parts—the external market and 
the internal market. The goal of this section is to explain the differences between the two 
markets, their make-up, their unique features, and the importance of differentiating 
between the two. 
First, the external market will be discussed. The main focus will be on the EU as a 
consumer. What is the make-up of the current fuel mix? How will the fuel mix change in 
the future? Does the EU itself act as an importer or is this still done by each nation? 
Concerning the EU‘s role as an importer, it is necessary to define its critical dependencies 
(oil and gas) and identify the providers. Where does Europe get its oil and gas? Who are 
the main exporting nations? What are their incentives? How dependent is Europe on these 
nations? 
After answering the above questions, the focus will then shift to the internal 
energy market, between the EU member states. What is the make-up of the internal 
market? What are the market arrangements? Do all countries distribute energy equally or 
are there barriers? Are all nations equally dependent on net importers or do some nations 
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have the internal advantage of being energy independent? The three leading countries in 
the EU have been chosen to explain the European internal energy market—France, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany. 
Before both markets are presented, a few explanations need to be made. Like 
every other market, the European energy market consists of two sides—demand and 
supply, in other words, importers and exporters, or consumers and producers.  The 
terminology ‗importers and exporters‘ refers to, the usual trade of natural resources (oil 
and gas).. This is important as there is a big difference between importers and exporters, 
and consumers and producers. Every nation is a consumer, but not every nation is an 
importer or producer. If a state does not have enough natural resources to satisfy its 
demand, it needs to import them. The proportion of natural resources in the fuel mix is a 
good indicator of the amount of dependency of that specific nation, which contributes to a 
large extent to the subject of energy security.  Once the natural resources are inside the 
country, they need to be refined and used to produce energy. This capacity needs to be 
present as well. A state is only fully energy independent if it does not have to rely on the 
imports of natural resources and also has the capacity to produce enough energy to satisfy 
its own demand. , By these criteria, not one single member state of the EU is fully energy 
independent. 
A. THE EXTERNAL MARKET 
1. Importing Energy Resources 
In order to evaluate the degree of Europe‘s energy dependency, it is important to 
analyze Europe‘s current and future fuel mix and its proven reserves of natural resources. 
The focus will be mainly on oil and gas, since here lies the EU‘s greatest dependency. 
Today the European Union can rely on several ways of creating energy in both 
primary usage sectors—electricity and transportation. According to the data provided by 
The European Commission, the fuel mix consists of five major segments—oil, gas, 
nuclear, solid fuels, and renewables. The largest share is made of oil (37%), followed by 
gas (24%), solid fuels (18%), nuclear (14%), and renewables (7%). 
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Figure 1.   EU-27, Energy Mix in 2006 (From European Commission, 2008) 114 
These are the numbers that account for all the 27-member states of the EU. Of 
course, there are great differences between the nations.115 Great Britain, still highly 
reliant on oil and gas due to its resources in the North Sea, has a different fuel mix than 
states like Germany or France, who have larger capacities for utilizing solid fuels or 
nuclear power. This also explains the great differences in imports of natural resources and 
the sources of exporting nations, which depend on the member state‘s interests in certain 
regions of the EU. 
More than one third of the fuel mix is made up of oil. In regards to power 
generation and transportation, nearly all the oil is used in the transportation sector. 
Transportation has the largest share of energy consumption, even larger than the whole 
industrial sector.116 ―Oil is king!‖ 117 This statement proves to be valid for the European 
energy market as well and it stresses out the importance of the transportation sector for 
the whole energy market. Even if the discussion regarding solar-driven or bio-fuel-driven 
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vehicles is present, up till now their percentage of the whole transportation sector is 
negligible.118 Thus, if the flow of oil was disrupted in Europe, the whole transportation 
sector would suffer. 
All other segments of the European energy fuel mix—gas, nuclear, solid fuels, 
and renewable—are for usage in the electricity sector. This counts for two thirds of the 
overall fuel mix. Compared to the transportation sector, the electricity sector has one 
great advantage—diversification of energy resources. If the supply of one of the segments 
is disrupted, the consequences would still be severe, but it would not affect the whole 
electricity sector. In fact, the diversification of energy resources can also be counted as 
part of resilience, another important key principle of energy security. 
Nevertheless, it is the EU‘s goal to satisfy its energy demand and therefore supply 
its energy production capacities with the specific resource needed. As mentioned above, 
none of the 27 member states of the EU is fully energy independent. The question that 
needs to be answered is: To what extent is the EU energy dependent and what are the 
trends for the future? 
The oil reserves within the EU represent a share of 0.5–0.8% of the world‘s 
proven oil reserves. The proven gas reserves of the EU represent a share of 1.4–2% of 
world gas reserves.119 The overall consumption rate of the 27 member states of the EU 
represents a share of 17% of the world‘s energy consumption.120 Reflecting the numbers 
from Figure 1, 61% of the energy fuel mix consists of oil and gas. Today, the EU needs to 
import about 50% of its total energy supply, with oil already at an import rate of 80% and 
gas of 54%.121 According to the report of the European Commission in 2006, this 
dependency will rise to 70% within the next 20–30 years.122 
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These numbers already show the EU‘s great dependence on imported fossil fuels. 
But, with a rising energy demand in Europe and a growing demand in countries like 
China, India, and Brazil, the dependence and the need for gaining access to energy 
resources obtains an even greater significance. The only scenario where European energy 
demand is expected to decline is when the targets set by the European Council in 2007—
a 20% reduction of greenhouse gases and 20% share of renewables by 2020—are met.123 
However, this is not certain. Despite the implementation of these targets, energy demand 
for the transportation sector would still increase by 4–8% by 2020.124 Thus, the 
dependency on imported fossil fuels remains a problem for the EU. 
Besides the dependency, the EU faces another problem—the fragmentation of the 
market. This is a great disadvantage for the European energy market because different 
interests and policies prevent the development of a common energy strategy.125 The EU 
does not buy natural resources from the exporting regions. This is done by the member 
states to fulfill their specific demands. Seen from the nations‘ point of view, this seems 
reasonable, but viewed from the EU‘s perspective, this is an unfortunate situation. All 
member states have agreed upon the policies made by the commission and it is also a 
known fact that the EU would be much stronger if national interest in regards to energy 
supply and energy security could be set aside, but ―member states have been careful not 
to sacrifice their individual rights to independently pursue external relations to secure 
energy supplies.‖126 This reflects a classic example of the ―prisoner‘s dilemma.‖.127 
Together they would be better off, but each nation fears that another nation would try to 
get the best deal, so they all try to get the best deal and everyone loses. This dilemma will 
be covered in more detail when the internal market of the EU is presented. The bottom 
line is that, Europe must speak with one voice when it comes to energy security politics. 
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Up to this point, the energy fuel mix in the EU has been presented and a great 
dependency on imports of energy resources has been identified. Now it is important to 
focus on the origin of the imports. Where does the EU get its oil and gas from? Who are 
the main trading partners, and what does this mean for Europe? 
2. Exporting Energy Resources Toward the European Union 
The largest reserves of energy resources (oil and gas) are located in four main 
areas—Russia, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, and North Africa. All are within reach 
of the EU, which is a great advantage for the EU.128 
All of the main exporters of crude oil to the EU—Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, 
Libya, and Norway—belong to the top twenty nations of proven oil reserves, And except 
for Norway, all of them belong to the top ten nations.129 
Russia accounts for 30.3% of crude oil exports to the EU, followed by Norway 
with 13.8%, Libya (9.1%), Saudi Arabia (6.4%), and Iran (5.6%). Already this accounts 
for 65.2% of all crude oil imports to the EU.130 And since Europe‘s own reserves are 
declining, this number is going to increase. 
In terms of natural gas imports, the EU receives its gas mainly from Russia, 
Norway, and Algeria. Again, all are in reach of the EU and belong to the top twenty 
nations to hold the largest amount of worldwide gas reserves. Russia accounts for 30.7% 
of the EU‘s gas imports, Norway for 20.1%, and Algeria for 12.9%. This is more than 
half of the overall gas imported into the EU, and it is expected to rise to 80% in the next 
25 years, if current trends remain the same.131 
Both, oil and gas can be transported two ways—via ship or pipeline. Ninety 
percent of all European trade is done by ship, which could be an indicator for ships being 
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the preferred method of transportation for oil and gas.132 For oil this is true, whereas for 
gas, pipelines are the preferred methods of transportation. Transportation via ship creates 
greater flexibility. Nearly 38,000 tankers navigate through the oceans to distribute oil 
from its origin to its consuming destination.133 The main trade routes for oil via ship to 
the European Union are by way of the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the North 
Sea, and the Baltic Sea as can be seen in Figure 2. Especially noteworthy are the 
maritime chokepoints—the Suez Channel, Gibraltar, the English Channel, and the Baltic 
Sea—since they pose a great threat to energy security in terms of environmental issues.  
 
Figure 2.   Indicated Tanker Traffic and Volume of Oil Transported in 2001 (From 
European Maritime Safety Agency, 2004)134 
Due to Russia‘s connection to the EU via land, the preferred method of 
transportation for oil is the use of pipelines. However, this is an exception.  Overall, the 
most used method of transporting oil is via ship. 
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The reason gas is mainly transferred via pipelines is its gaseous state. Natural gas 
occupies a volume 600 times greater than oil. Therefore, transportation of gas via ship is 
not the preferred method, as expenses are higher.135 When gas is being transported by 
ship, it is usually as liquefied natural gas (LNG), meaning the natural gas needs to be 
cooled down to transform from its gaseous state into the liquid state. This is a very costly 
process, but it has the advantages of reducing the natural gas‘ volume and creating greater 
flexibility using ships as transportation devices. Further, by using this method, gas can be 
transferred to the EU more easily from North Africa, where the erection of a pipeline 
through the Mediterranean Sea would cost even more. Since the EU receives most of its 
gas from Russia, pipelines are the preferred method of transportation. But it is important 
to emphasize that pipelines do have several disadvantages in comparison to ships. The 
construction of a pipeline is a long-term investment. Long-term trade agreements and a 
sufficient amount of trust with the trade partner are needed to justify such large 
investments. For example, the costs of the Nord Stream pipeline are projected to be 7.4 
billion EUR, which is about 9.5 billion USD.136 Pipelines usually have a length of several 
hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Several border crossings are common, so specific 
trade arrangements with transit states have to be made. Also, pipelines, mainly due to 
their length, are more difficult to protect than ships, which is another important factor 
with regards to energy security. 
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Figure 3.   Main European Gas Pipelines (From Real Instituto Elcano 2009)137 
Figure 3 illustrates the pipeline network, showing the major pipelines from Russia 
to Eastern and Central Europe. It is clear how complex the pipeline system in Europe is. 
Except for one pipeline, all the rest have to cross several borders to bring the gas to its 
destination and all of them are at least several hundred kilometers long. For example, the 
Nord Stream pipeline will have a total length of 1,220 kilometers and it is not the longest 
pipeline in Europe.138 The maintenance and protection of a pipeline network of that size 
is a great challenge for the EU and its exporting nations. The challenge will probably be 
greater for the EU since the security of the supply of fossil energy resources is most 
important for the EU. Seen from the exporter‘s perspective, they are looking at the long 
run for security of demand, but the EU is not the only trading partner demanding energy 
resources. And global demand is rising. 
To sum it up, Europe‘s energy position in the external energy market is currently 
not too bad. Europe‘s energy resources are declining, and therefore it needs to import a 
greater share of fossil fuels to satisfy its energy demand. Europe is in close proximity to 
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the largest proven reserves of oil and gas, so gaining and securing access to these proven 
reserves of resources is important. This is done through long-term trade agreements. The 
worldwide recognition of the EU as a reliable trading partner and a strong economic 
power supports this. But there are also some problems associated with Europe‘s position. 
Due to declining resources, the EU is forced to import energy resources and due to 
worldwide declining resources, the remaining resources are ―concentrated in the hands of 
a small number of countries.‖139 Diversification of supply, one of the key principles of 
energy security, is limited. Further, the remaining resources are located in regions of 
which ―some are threatened by insecurity.‖140 The current civil war in Lybia is proof of 
this fact, which is not an easy situation on which to build long-term relations. Saudi 
Arabia is considered to have elements of instability within its regime, which also affects 
long-term relations. Russia, despite its special relationship to the EU, has used its energy 
potential several times in the past as a political weapon, so far, however, not against the 
EU itself. In addition, the Russian government has very close control over its energy 
sector and associated firms.141 
The pure dependency on imports of natural energy resources is not the problem 
per se, but it ―requires an active energy security strategy with a good diversified fuel mix, 
mechanisms to deal with crisis, greater diversification of suppliers and supply routes and 
a well-functioning internal market with good interconnections.‖142 
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B. THE INTERNAL MARKET 
The degree of dependency of the EU as whole has been depicted in the previous 
section. As it has been pointed out, the dependency itself is not the problem as long as it 
is accompanied by an active energy security strategy. The necessity of a well-functioning 
internal market is part of this strategy. But what is the idea behind an internal market? 
The fuel mix in the EU differs greatly between EU member states.143 Some 
nations might be more dependent on Russian gas than the EU; Estonia and Finland are 
100% dependent on Russian gas.144 Other nations might be nearly energy independent 
due to the make-up of their fuel mix—France generates nearly 80% of its electricity from 
nuclear power plants.145 But what they all have in common is the dependency on oil for 
the transportation sector as the percentage of alternative engine-driven vehicles is still 
very low. Still, the dependency on oil imports and the diversification of suppliers varies 
greatly between EU member states. 
The idea of an internal energy market is that the EU takes advantage of its given 
single European market by enlarging EU-wide energy production, increasing the amount 
of alternative and renewable energy sources, creating greater network interconnectivity in 
the different national energy systems, and sharing their resources within the EU. This 
would significantly increase European energy supply security and cost efficiency.146 
At first the focus will be on the differences between several EU member states 
according to their fuel mix make-up, their own natural resources, dependence on imports, 
national policies and national interests in either foreign energy trade arrangements and 
their own energy companies, and future developments. The three largest economies, 
which are also the most influential nations, in terms of European politics, have been 
chosen to highlight the differences in their specific energy set up and interests—France, 
the UK, and Germany. They have been chosen not only because of their economic power 
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and European influence, but also because of their energy set up and dependency. France, 
with nuclear power occupying nearly 80% of its power generation is a highly energy 
independent nation. France can be referred to as a MAKE state, in terms of energy 
production for power generation. The UK, still relying on its own natural reserves of oil 
and gas, which are declining rapidly, is in transformation from a MAKE to a BUY state. 
Germany, with no large proven reserves of oil and gas, is an example of a classic BUY 
state. 
1. France 
Looking at the two primary energy usage sectors, France is highly independent in 
power generation and highly dependent in the transportation sector. Due to the lack of 
existing energy resources, France needs to import all of its oil and gas. The transportation 
sector has a 31% share of the final energy consumption and oil has a share of 33% of the 
primary energy supply. Nearly all of the imported oil is used in the transportation sector. 
A disruption of the supply of oil imports would have a severe impact on the French 
transportation sector. All of its imported gas (14%) is used in the power generation sector 
but gas only accounts for a small share in the overall domestic power generation 
production (12%). Nearly 80% of French power generation is derived from nuclear 
technology, followed by 10% derived from renewables. An increase in the amount of gas 
used in the power generation sector has been noted.147 Nuclear technology is the 
backbone of France‘s power generation, making France independent from imports of oil 
and gas used for electricity. It also puts France in the position of being an exporter of 
electricity to its neighbouring states. In terms of importing necessary natural resources, 
France is fully dependent, but their fossil fuel imports are well diversified.148 France 
imports its oil from Norway, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Kazahkstan, and Iran. Gas is imported 
from Norway, Russia, the Netherlands, Algeria, and Egypt.149 
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France has identified four key principles of energy policy: security of energy 
supply, competitive energy supply, sustainable energy development, and equal level of 
energy service to all territories and all citizens.150 In addition, it is France‘s goal to 
reduce its CO2 emissions by 75% by 2050, which is a very ambitious goal. France is also 
willing to adhere to the EU directives with the opening of the energy market to more 
competition. This has also been accompanied by several side effects, which hamper an 
increase in market competition—the fragility of the domestic electricity transmission 
system and the existence of energy market tariffs.151 
France is a key player in the construction of greater interconnection and 
infrastructure development inside the EU. Due to its geographic position in the centre of 
Europe and its great share of nuclear technologies in electricity generation, France will be 
able to distribute electricity accordingly as the center of a future European energy 
network. This would follow the European Commission directives, but still needs to be 
implemented accordingly. 
Due to existing market tariffs, the energy market of France is controlled by a 
small number of companies. TOTAL (oil) and GdF Suez (gas) belong to the fifteen 
largest energy companies in the world.152 GdF Suez is mostly state-owned, similar to 
EdF, which is completely state-owned and holds the monopoly on electricity generation 
and distribution in France.153 This market setup also hampers the implementation of EU 
directives concerning more liberalization in the European energy market in terms of 
increased competition. 
France, due to the advantage of its geographic location and its independence in 
the power generation sector, can play a major role in the further development of a 
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European energy market. Most of all, adjustments have to be made in the fragile 
electricity distribution network, the reduction of tariffs, and the abandonment of state-
owned monopolies.  
2. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom can still rely on natural resources of oil and gas, but they are 
declining at a great speed. Currently, the UK still has 0.34 trillion cubic meters of gas and 
3.4 billion barrels of oil as proven reserves. Compared to the largest known reserves 
(Russia: 43.30 trillion cubic meters of gas; Saudi Arabia: 264.1 billion barrels of oil) this 
is a very small share of the world‘s reserves.154 But the UK still exports oil and is a 
negative net-importer of oil, which means that the UK can still rely on its own oil 
resources. The amount of imported gas is also a very small amount. Only 6% of all 
energy related net imports consist of gas. The UK has one of the lowest dependencies on 
imports in the EU. The highest share of imports is solid fuels (90%), but it only accounts 
for 16% of the primary energy supply and 7% of domestic production.155 In comparison 
to France, the UK is dependent in both primary usage sectors—electricity and 
transportation—but at a lesser rate. Overall, the UK energy dependency rates at 21.3%.156 
The UK is the largest producer of oil (43%) and gas (39%) in the EU. Electricity 
is generated out of gas (40%), coal (33%), and nuclear (20%). Main import nations are 
Norway (oil and gas), Russia (gas and coal), and South Africa and Australia (coal).157 
Due to the Commonwealth, the UK has the advantage of relying on imports from former 
colonies. 
Because of the decline of its own natural resources, which then results in a rising 
dependency on imports, the UK energy policy focuses on two major themes; security for 
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energy supply and energy efficiency.158 Like France, the UK has committed itself to 
reduce CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050. The UK was actually the first country to 
announce a reduction of CO2 emissions, one of the first states to develop a certificate 
obligation program for renewable energy, and a program to increase energy efficiency. 
The UK is known to be very innovative with energy policies.159 
The UK believes in the controlling function of the market. Again, the UK was  the 
first nation to fully liberalize its gas and electricity markets. A regulation department—
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)—has been founded to set the energy 
market regulations that are necessary in any competitive market.160 
The UK‘s recognition of its declining resources is an important factor for energy 
security. The UK is aware of the rising need to import gas, coal, and oil, but it‘s the 
import of gas that creates the biggest challenge for the UK. The geographic location of 
the UK as an island does not favor the construction of a gas pipeline network. A few 
pipelines from Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium are in place, but further pipelines 
are too costly. Being dependent on further imports of gas, the UK has, therefore, to 
increase its LNG capacities with sufficient receiving ports and storage capacities. This 
will include large investment sums,, but any delay will ―hamper the ability of the market 
to respond quickly to demand and therefore jeopardize energy security.‖161 
3. Germany 
Germany is highly dependent on energy resource imports for the electricity sector 
as well as the transportation sector. In addition, Germany does not have large amounts of 
natural resources other than coal. Germany ranks as the twelfth country in terms of 
proven reserves of coal, at an estimated amount of 6,708 million tons. Compared to the 
country with the largest proven reserves, the USA, with 238,308 million tons of coal, it‘s 
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a small number, but it is still the largest producer of coal in the EU.162 Germany with a 
61.3% dependency on the importation of fossil fuels, is more dependent than the EU 
average.163 The main importing nations are Russia and Norway for oil and gas, the 
Netherlands for gas, and Poland, Russia and South Africa for coal.164 
Germany has a fairly diverse fuel mix, consisting of oil (36%), solid fuels (25%), 
gas (23%), nuclear (12%), and renewables (4%). In terms of domestic production, 
Germany is the largest producer of coal, the second largest producer of nuclear energy, 
and the third largest producer of gas within the EU. Electricity is generated to nearly 50% 
out of coal, followed by nuclear (27%). Gas and renewables have increased their share of 
electricity generation significantly.165 
Germany plays a major role in European energy security due to its size and 
strategic position in Europe. Germany is constantly evolving its energy security, 
economic efficiency and environmental sustainability, the ―three E‘s‖ of good energy 
policy.166 The foundation of an electricity network regulator (the Bundesnetzagentur) is 
one example of creating more economic efficiency, whereas the efforts of seeking a 
greater partnership with Gazprom, in terms of energy security can be debated. Also, the 
prognosticated shutdown of all nuclear power plants by 2022 will not increase energy 
security; it will decrease it as it is unclear to what extent the share of nuclear power 
generation will be overtaken by renewables or new coal plants.167 The number of 
renewables is rising, but not enough to replace nuclear energy. New coal plants are 
controversial as they do not coincide with the reduction of CO2 emissions. Right now, in 
Germany, the government‘s proposal to prolong the life span of nuclear power plants is 
the number one topic of discussion, but, up to this point, there are no other alternatives. 
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With its last country report, the IEA developed three key recommendations for 
Germany in order to maintain its development of the ―three E‘s‖ of energy policy: 
 Reconsider the nuclear phase-out in light of the possible serious 
adverse consequences of its unaltered implementation for security 
of supply, economic efficiency and carbon dioxide emissions. 
 Continue to reform the electricity and gas markets in order to set a 
level playing field for the development of genuine competition, 
particularly with respect to network access. 
 Ensure a consistent, co-ordinated and cost-effective climate change 
and renewables policy.168 
All of the above-mentioned points are part of the present ongoing energy 
discussion in Germany. Germany promised to shutdown all of its nuclear power plants by 
2022 but alternatives are missing to take over the base load provided by nuclear power 
generation. New coal plants, with less carbon dioxide emissions, could be one solution 
but investments would have to be made now. On the other side, even if new coal plants 
have a less carbon dioxide footprint than today‘s coal plants, they still are higher than 
CO2 emissions from nuclear power plants and would challenge the promised goal of 
Germany to fulfill the EU directive to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020. 
Right now, Germany has to make very difficult decisions: fulfilling the promise of 
shutting down all nuclear power plants will reduce energy security in terms of security of 
supply. Constructing new coal plants to take over the baseload provided by nuclear power 
plants will take large investment sums and could challenge the promised goal of CO2 
emission reduction. Currently, Germany is investing large sums of money in renewables 
technologies in order to comply with the 20% share of the renewables of the overall fuel 
mix by 2020. 
Germany is also well set up in its security of supply, and its energy demand, in 
terms of in reducing its CO2 emissions and increasing its share of renewables. But, 
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―Germany lacks a co-ordinated and integrated environmental policy.‖ Large sums are 
spent to ―tackle climate change‖ while ―other policies underline many of its good 
efforts.‖169 
All three countries differ greatly in their energy mix set up, their dependence on 
imports of fossil fuels and their national policies. On one hand, it creates variety, but on 
the other hand it also creates obstacles for the further development of a European internal 
energy market. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, the Commission has been eager to promote 
the development of a single European energy market, comparable to the already existing 
single European market.170 The commission focused on four primary objectives: 
 Implementation of a single energy market with adequate competition and 
efficiency in the production and delivery of electricity and gas 
 Lowering the prices; all EU customers are given the opportunity to choose 
their energy supplier 
 Improve the environment 
 Enhance energy security171 
All of the EU member states are committed to these objectives and, as was 
verified by the selection of the three main players of the EU, all are trying to address 
these challenges. So far, no single energy market with adequate competition has been 
created. There are two reasons for this.  The first one is that national interests play an 
important role in energy politics. Energy is too important to nations and their 
development to give up national control. In fact, some nations created boundaries to 
protect their own national energy industries.172 Second, there are technical barriers. 
Electricity is not storable and is dependent upon a physical network. Transportation is 
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only possible over very limited distances. These characteristics of electricity favor 
regional fragmentation of the electricity market.173 
All member states have agreed on the opening of the energy market. However,  
only a few, like Britain, have created a competitive energy market.  EU customers are not 
given the opportunity to choose their energy supplier. In Germany, competition for the 
electricity market was enlarged in the mid 2000s but this accounts only for the 
distribution of electricity, and not the production. France still maintains the concept of 
tariffs and monopolies, hindering other companies to even enter the market. This might 
increase energy security on a national level, but not on the EU level. Prices also vary 
greatly in the EU. There is no fixed price level for gas, oil or electricity. Germany‘s 
domestic electricity price (0.211 EUR per kWh) is more than double to Greece‘s (0.089 
EUR per kWh). Fuel prices differ from 1.08 EUR per liter (Cyprus) to 1.63 EUR per liter 
(the Netherlands).174 
Environmental issues are highly prioritized topics for the EU. The EU signed the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which binds nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions ―to 
an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008–2012.‖175 
So far, fifteen EU member states have already fulfilled the Kyoto Protocol agreements.176 
Despite the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has imposed its goal of ―climate change opportunity‖ 
— 20 20 by 2020: the reduction of greenhouse gases by 20% and the increase of 
renewables to up to 20% by 2020.177 Whether this can be achieved is not yet certain. 
It is the overall goal of the EU to enhance energy security. The realization of the 
importance of this fact is a giant step towards greater energy security. The EU 
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commission has already launched several key papers that comment on Europe‘s position 
on energy issues as they are linked with environmental, economic, and security, with the 
Green Paper being the most important one.178 
Up to this point, as was pointed out in the last section, the EU still lacks several 
implementations.  Besides technical and geographic characteristics, such as the inability 
to store electricity, or the geographic location of the UK, which complicates the exchange 
of energy through an open market, so far, the implementation of energy security is 
lacking mainly due to political, economic and national policies. 
The EU has achieved a lot over the last decades, even when it comes to security 
issues and common foreign policies where member states tend to guard their sovereignty. 
When it comes to energy security and using the market as a tool to increase energy 
security, national interests and sovereignty issues are counterproductive. The member 
states have to open their markets to European-wide competition, increase 
interconnectivity and interoperability to allow the exchange of energy, decrease their 
dependence on foreign imports, continue to diversify the EU-wide fuel mix, enlarge 
energy efficiency and reduce the carbon dioxide footprint, and invest in new and long-
term focused energy production and new technologies. 
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IV. THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE 
Europe's fossil energy resources are declining. In 2006 alone, the European Union 
had a demand for 532 bcm of natural gas.179 If the EU was independent from imported 
gas and if current demand remained the same, then the EU would run out of natural gas in 
six to seven years. But demand does not remain the same. In 2030, the IEA expects 
European demand to reach 681 bcm, incorporating an annual growth rate of 1.0%.180 To 
cover the deficiencies, the EU already imports large amounts of its energy supply. 
Natural gas from Russia already accounts for 45% of the EU's gas imports181 and 
80% of Russia's gas is transported to the European Union via the Ukraine.182 Therefore, 
by looking at the numbers, it is not surprising that the construction of new pipelines is 
encouraged by the European Commission to satisfy Europe's energy demands. The Nord 
Stream pipeline is estimated to reach its maximum output of 55 bcm per year by 2012.183 
This accounts for 10% of current European gas consumption. 
A. OVERVIEW 
“Nord Stream is more than just a pipeline. It is a new channel for Russian natural 
gas exports, and a major infrastructure project which sets a new benchmark for 
cooperation between the European Union and Russia.”184 
 
This statement is found on the webpage of the Nord Stream AG and leaves room 
for interpretation. It is a fact that the amount of natural gas delivered through the pipeline 
will significantly contribute to meet Europe's energy demands today and in the future. On 
the other hand, no other pipeline project before has been questioned and criticized so 
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often. What are the reasons that the Nord Stream pipeline has been and still is under harsh 
critique from nations, politicians, energy experts, security analysts, ecologist, etc.? Who 
benefits from the construction of the pipeline and who does not? Are there any risks 
associated? And what role does Russia's leading elite play in the project, if any? 
To answer these questions, it is first necessary to give the reader an overview of 
the Nord Stream pipeline and the main facts. Second, to answer the question of the role of 
Russia's leading elite, it is important to have a closer look at Russia's energy policy and 
how it is perceived outside of Russia. Finally, the importance of the Nord Stream pipeline 
for Russia will be highlighted by focusing on the interconnection between the Nord 
Stream AG and the Kremlin. Is the Nord Stream pipeline ―a major infrastructure project 
that sets a new benchmark for cooperation between the European Union and Russia,‖185 
or is it simply a tool for Russian politics to increase its leverage on European politics? 
1. The History 
In 1997, a shared company, North Transgas Oy, was founded between Russia's 
Gazprom and the Finish Company, Neste, whose main task was to examine new, 
alternative pipeline transit routes from Russia through the Baltic Sea to Germany. In 
1998, the company submitted a feasibility study that concluded that a pipeline project 
through the Baltic Sea would be technically feasible and economically efficient.186 
In December 2000, the European Union validated the Baltic Sea pipeline project 
as a ―Project of Interest‖ in accordance with the Trans-European Energy Networks 
guidelines (TEN-E).187 Between 2001 and 2004, two major German energy companies, 
E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall, became closely linked to the project, whereas the 
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Finish company, Fortum (earlier known as Neste), pulled out of the Baltic Sea pipeline 
project in 2005, after Gazprom made an announcement in 2004 that made further Finish 
participation needless.188 
In 2005, the North European Gas Pipeline company (later renamed in Nord 
Stream AG) was founded by Gazprom (51%), E.ON Ruhrgas (24.5%) and 
BASF/Wintershall (24.5%).189 It is remarkable that this incident had such a major 
political impact that Russia's President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin and 
Germany's Chancellor (now Chairman of the Shareholders Committee of the Nord 
Stream AG) Gerhard Schröder were present.190 
In 2006, the Nord Stream AG joint venture was joined by the Dutch energy 
company Gasunie, which bought from E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall each a share 
of 4.5%, a total of 9%.191 Its youngest shareholder, the French energy provider, GDF 
SUEZ, joined the Nord Stream AG in 2010. Today, shares of Nord Stream AG are 
distributed as follows: Gazprom (51%), E.ON Ruhrgas (15.5%), BASF/Wintershall 
(15.5%), Gasunie (9%), and GDF SUEZ (9%).192 
Construction of the pipeline started in April 2010 and the first pipeline is 
estimated to be fully operational by the end of 2011. The second pipeline is estimated to 
be fully operational in 2012, but construction of the second line has not yet started.193 
2. The Main Facts 
Nord Stream AG is a joint venture of five major European energy companies: 
Gazprom, E.ON Ruhrgas, BASF/Wintershall, Gasunie, and GDF SUEZ. Gazprom 
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remains the largest shareholder with a 51% stake. The joint venture's headquarters are 
located in Zug, Switzerland194 and a branch office is located in Moscow, Russia.195 
The Nord Stream pipeline will consist of two parallel lines. Line 1 is already 
under construction and so far the estimated date of when the first gas reaches Europe, the 
end of 2011, seems accomplishable. The pipeline will have an overall length of 1,224 
kilometers and will travel from Vyborg, Russia through Finish and Swedish exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) to Greifswald, Germany (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.   The Planned Pipeline Route (From Nord Stream, n.d.)196 
Both lines together will have a supply capacity of 55 bcm per year and will be one 
of   the longest offshore pipelines worldwide.197 The source of the gas is located in the 
Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas reserve, Yamal Peninsula, Ob-Taz bay and 
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Shtokmanovskoye fields.198 According to Gazprom, the Yuzhno-Russkoye field is 
estimated to have proven reserves of approximately 1000 bcm,199 whereas the Yamal 
Peninsula is estimated at 16 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of proven reserves. An additional 
22 tcm have recently been discovered on the Yamal Peninsula and adjacent offshore 
fields.200 Concerning the Ob-Taz bay and Shtokmanovskoye fields, no information is 
available on Gazprom‘s official web page. 
The overall costs of the Nord Stream pipeline are estimated at 7.4 billion EUR. 
The shareholder companies, proportionate to their respective share, will provide 30% of 
the costs. Seventy percent of the costs will be provided through direct investments by the 
international banking sector.201 This amount will only cover construction costs. 
Operational and maintenance costs are not included, according to a study of the Swedish 
Defense Research Agency by Robert L. Larsson. In fact, Larsson says that the costs may 
have been underestimated and, according to energy and financial experts, the costs could 
reach as high as 10–15 billion EUR.202 
Several experts have also questioned why the transit route through the Baltic Sea 
was chosen. In their opinion a land-based solution passing through the Baltic States and 
Poland (known as the Amber pipeline) or updating and building a second line on the 
Yamal pipeline, passing through the Ukraine and Poland, would have been much cheaper 
than the sea-based option. But, despite the additional costs, the Nord Stream AG rejected 
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the land-based options because ―there is a need to become independent of politically 
unstable transit states, and … a second Yamal pipeline will not contribute to route 
diversification.‖203 
Nord Stream will deliver large amounts of gas to Europe and it will contribute 
toward satisfying Europe's energy demand in the long run. However, there are several 
facts that are disturbing about this project: the unclear financial situation, the preference 
of a much more costly solution because of ―unstable transit states‖ like Poland and the 
Baltic States, which are all members of the European Union. In this context, it should be 
kept in mind that the Nord Stream pipeline project was ranked by the European 
Commission as a ―Project of Interest‖ according to the TEN-E guidelines. It also remains 
unclear whether the numbers concerning proven gas reserves provided by Gazprom can 
and should be used as a solid base for enormous investments in the Russian gas sector. In 
addition, the distribution of shares between the shareholders also leaves room for 
interpretation, since Gazprom has nearly unrestricted power over the Nord Stream 
pipeline due to its 51% stake.  
B. RUSSIAN ENERGY POLITICS 
“Energy is both a factor that influences a state‟s foreign policy outcomes and a 
potential tool of foreign policy.”204 
 
This statement is valid all over the world. Today it might be even more valid than 
it was in history, but energy has always been the most important driver for a nation's 
economy and wealth. Energy politics and energy matters are closely interconnected. 
While the economy of a nation depends on energy to produce its goods, energy 
dependence has also become an issue for every household, at least in developed 
countries. 
Energy is the necessary fuel to keep the engines of the economy and of everyday 
life running. Therefore, it is only natural that energy companies and the government are 
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engaging in the issue of the rising energy demand together. Companies rely on the 
government to create necessary conditions for a favorable investment atmosphere 
whereas the government relies on the companies to provide the necessary amount of 
energy needed. Both sides depend on each other. In times of diminishing resources and a 
greater dependency on foreign resources, as it is with the case of the European Union, 
energy politics become an even greater issue on the work agenda of foreign policy. For 
this reason, it is not surprising that Russian energy politics and foreign policy are closely 
interconnected. 
This chapter will focus on Russian energy politics and its scope. How are Russian 
energy politics defined and how close are energy and foreign politics interconnected? 
What are Russia's intensions? And how are Russian energy politics perceived outside of 
Russia? 
1. The Russian View 
In 2009, Russia released its current National Security Strategy: National Security 
Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020. This paper is the Kremlin‘s main paper   
that describes how Russia wants to defend and secure its national security and defines 
areas of interests for national security.205 Energy occupies a central role for Russian 
national security. It is perceived in three different ways: as a matter of future trends of 
development, ensuring Russia's national security, and economic growth. Russia views its 
―resource potential‖ as a possibility to ―reinforce the influence of the Russian Federation 
on the world stage‖ and aspires ―ownership of energy resources, including in the Near 
East, the Barents Sea Shelf and other parts of the Arctic, the Caspian Basin, and in 
Central Asia‖ as a tool for international politics.206 
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Concerning the insurance of national security, ―an intensification of competition 
over insufficient raw material, like energy‖ is viewed as a possible threat to Russia's 
national security.207 
In terms of economic growth ―the loss of control over national resources and the 
worsening of the condition of the industrial and energy resource base‖ possess a direct 
threat to Russia.208 Energy security is viewed as a ―long-term direction for national 
security.‖209 
Russia has the world's largest proven natural gas reserves. With 44.9 tcm it owns 
30% more than Iran, which has the second largest reserves of natural gas.210 Fossil 
energy resources are highly valued products that the whole world is interested in. Three 
European nations, Germany, Italy and France, belong in the top five worldwide importers 
of natural gas, which makes the EU the largest gas market.211  
As has been pointed out by Oliker, et al., ―Russia's foreign policy is driven by the 
same goals as Russia's domestic policy.‖212 This is especially the case with Russia's 
energy policy. Even though Russia contains the world's largest proven reserves of natural 
gas and is the second largest producer of gas (663,6 bcm per year), due to its own 
domestic consumption (457 bcm per year) and international export agreements (241 bcm 
per year),213 Russia needs to import gas to fulfill its domestic and international 
commitments. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia defines energy as a central matter 
of national security and Russia tries to maximize its influence over energy resources 
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within Russia and the post-soviet sphere, which Russia considers to be their area with 
―privileged interests,‖ as can be found in Friedman's: The Medvedev Doctrine and 
American Strategy.214 To not become dependent on imports of fossil fuels itself, Russia 
tries to bring the resources within the post-soviet sphere under its control. Russia believes 
that energy is the new political tool that helps to rebuild Russia's justified right to being 
perceived as a world power. This can only be achieved by ―strengthening Russia's market 
position, maximizing its export capabilities and using gas supplies for the purpose of 
Russia's political interests.‖215 The current Energy Strategy of Russia even recommends a 
―strengthening of the state participation and control in the (…) gas sector.‖216 ―The state 
must support Russian companies in the struggle for resources and markets and vice versa 
Russian companies must support the state in the struggle for political interest and 
influence.‖217 
During Putin's time as President of Russia, the energy sector underwent a 
complete transformation. Putin realized how much political potential lay within Russia's 
natural resources. This meant that the state had to restore its control over the energy 
sector ―and should serve as a basis for restoring the Russian state, its economy, military, 
and ultimately its pride.‖218 From the Russian perspective, this has been done very 
effectively. Putin managed to reduce the influence of Russia's oligarchs drastically, which 
have ascended during Yeltsin's Presidency, as he was politically dependent on their 
power and influence. 
The gas-producing giant, Gazprom, is officially a privatized company, but it is 
state owned. It is the government that uses Gazprom's economic power to boost the 
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Russian economy and extend its political influence. Therefore, it is important for Russia 
to maintain close state control over the energy sector. Foreign investment, which is 
crucial for the development of the Russian economy, is limited in areas of ―strategic 
importance of state security and defense.‖219 The energy sector is of strategic importance 
for Russia as it has been stressed out within the National Security Strategy. The limitation 
of foreign investment naturally reduces the pace of Russia's economic growth. The 
Russian government is well aware of that. An open market would attract a large number 
of foreign investors, and competition has always been a main driver for a stable and 
growing economy, but this would also reduce Russia's political potential because Russia's 
international political power depends on energy. This cannot be allowed by the Russian 
state; it is a natural act of protectionism. 
Thus, the Kremlin believes that, maintaining close state control over the energy 
sector is crucial for Russia. By creating a state owned monopoly over the gas market 
(Gazprom is already one of the largest and most influential gas producers and suppliers 
worldwide), the government controls the supply side of natural gas. Speaking 
economically, a larger demand over a smaller supply increases the possibilities for the 
supplier. With the establishment of a monopoly, the supplier is able to have a very elastic 
price policy and increases the dependence of the consumers. The Russian government has 
very well understood the basic principles of a market economy and price politics. ―It is 
quite natural that state-owned companies—Transneft and Gazprom—are responsible for 
oil and gas transit under the regulation of the Federal Energy Commission.‖220 
On that account, it makes sense for Russia to enlarge its influence over the energy 
sector, not only in Russia, but also in adjacent areas. By not only controlling its own 
natural resources, but also of their neighbors (Russia's area of privileged interests),221 
Russia's position as one of the largest producers and suppliers of gas is being further 
manifested. It is part of Russia's strategy ―to lock in supply by consolidating control over 
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strategic energy infrastructure throughout Europe and Eurasia.‖222 This further increases 
the possibility of energy being used as political leverage. 
Russia also knows that as a supplier, it is also highly dependent on consumers‘ 
demand. This especially accounts for the gas industry and is a potential threat for Russia. 
Gas cannot be transported as easily as oil. Only two options exist and both of them 
require large investments and are limiting factors for the supplier's possibilities of 
diversification—the transportation of gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG) via ship or via 
pipelines. If the consumers‘ demand decreases, it is very difficult for the supplier to re-
route gas to other interested customers. Also, the high investment costs create long 
dependencies for consumers as well as suppliers. In light of this, it is understandable, 
from a Russian perspective, that Putin made energy security a main topic at the G8 
summit in 2006 in St. Petersburg: ―Russia insisted on providing demand guarantees for 
the producers, and sharing responsibilities and risks among energy suppliers, consumers, 
and transit states.‖223 Russia must not only cover its own domestic demand but also the 
demand of its interconnected consumers and must maintain the production of energy and 
supply of gas profitable, which means that prices must be affordable to attract future 
investors in new pipeline projects or LNG terminals. Russia is not only responsible for its 
own energy security, but also, to some degree, for the energy security of its customers, 
like Europe.224 
Both pipelines and LNG terminals are costly to build, maintain and repair. Once 
their life span has been reached, they need to be replaced. Fourteen percent of Russia's 
pipeline infrastructure needs to be renovated and an additional 20% have already been 
used for more than twenty years. This will cost the Russian state tens of billions of 
dollars, money that Russia does not have.225 Therefore, to be able to fulfill its domestic 
and international commitments, Russia's only chance is to further promote its attempt to 
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create an energy monopoly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In addition, Russia is 
seeking strategic partnerships with other gas producers like Iran, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria 
and some Central Asian countries. The focus here lies on a proactive penetration of the 
European market to be able to influence prices and consumption rates and acquire new 
contracts and additional investments.226 
In the Russian view, the creation of a state-owned gas monopoly for Europe and 
Central Asia, greater dependency of Europe on Russian gas, and gaining control over the 
energy sectors of the Russian post-soviet sphere of influence contribute to Russian energy 
security, its national security, enhance Russia's wealth and promote Russia's claim as a 
world power. Energy is the leverage to advance Russia's political influence and is 
therefore placed in ―the center of Russian diplomacy.‖227 
2. The External Perception 
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Russia's main incentive within the 
energy sector is gaining control. Control over a nation's economy must, per se, not be a 
bad thing, but Moscow is not only gaining control over its domestic energy sector but 
also over international energy markets, especially its post-soviet neighbors. This is the 
reason why international consumers of Russian gas should be worried because it largely 
reduces their leverage on energy politics (even within their own nation) and increases 
Russia's sphere of influence. 
Lacking transparency in the Russian energy sector is another fact that is reason for 
worry by international customers. For them, it is difficult to base investment decisions on 
unreliable information about future production rates of natural gas, the state of 
development of natural gas fields and the unclear financial situation of Russia's largest 
gas company, Gazprom. According to a report from Chatham House based on a seminar 
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discussing transparency in Russia and Eurasia and energy security in Europe in 2008, 
―50% of the money Gazprom invests in development simply disappears.‖228 
In addition, uncertainty remains with importing nations as to how Moscow will be 
using energy as a political tool to enlarge its international influence and to enforce 
Russia's international interests. From an economic point of view, the Russian energy 
sector does not currently reflect an investment-friendly atmosphere for international 
investors. This is also due to the fact that Moscow has restricted foreign investment in the 
energy sector as a matter of strategic interests.229 Russia has used its energy weapon 
before and for some critics, it is not a question of if Russia is using the energy weapon 
again, but when. 
a. Gaining Control 
Russia's expansion of its sphere of influence has so far mainly influenced 
its domestic market and adjacent post-soviet neighbors. Under Putin's presidency, the 
government started to retrieve control over the energy sector within Russia. The most 
prominent case is the dismantling of Yukos, one of the largest independent oil companies 
in Russia. Yukos was confronted with the charge of tax evasion and its CEO Mikhael 
Khodorkovsky was imprisoned. In 2006, all assets of the company were put under state 
control and the company had to declare bankruptcy.230 In December 2010, 
Khodorkovsky was again sentenced to an additional six years in prison, a verdict that was 
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Rights Committee of the European Parliament in January 2011.231 Most striving about 
the second trial that Putin himself found Khodorkovsky guilty even before the court had 
announced the verdict, which leaves room for interpretation concerning the independence 
of the Russian legal system. 
The domestic gas market is controlled by Russia's largest private 
company, Gazprom. The company accounts for approximately 85% of Russia's gas 
production and owns the entire gas transportation system: Unified System of Gas 
Supplies (USGS). In addition, Gazprom has the monopoly over exporting gas abroad, 
which has been confirmed by the 2006 law of gas exports.232 Besides Gazprom, a few 
independent companies are present in the domestic gas industry, and Gazprom officially 
welcomes their participation. It is assumed that independent gas production will help to 
satisfy growing domestic demand and will also put Gazprom in the position to use more 
of its produced gas for the ―more lucrative international market.‖233 
Outside of Russia, Moscow retrieved control over large parts of the energy 
markets of former members of the Soviet Union. Most of these actions are directed 
towards greater control of the gas distribution network in Europe. In the view of Russian 
officials, a situation where ―neighboring states should trade their sovereignty for energy 
security‖ is favorable and that ―Russia should lead the Community of Independent States 
(CIS) through an economic occupation of neighboring states.‖234 In 1998, Gazprom 
bought large shares of the Bulgarian gas company, Topenergy.235 Moscow tried to 
destabilize the government of Georgia for over a decade by supporting the pro-Russia 
territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia's opening towards the West and plans 
to allow transits of gas from Central Asia to Europe circumventing the Russian-controlled 
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pipeline network resulted in the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008.236 Other neighboring 
states have been offered moderately priced energy supplies in exchange for control of 
their respective energy infrastructure. States that did not comply were ―immediately 
forced to pay the same prices as European customers or abruptly lose supply during the 
winter.‖237 The winter crisis of 2006–2007 in the Ukraine, which resulted in a shortage of 
gas distributed in Europe, also resulted in ―establishing a shadow Russian Swiss 
registered company, RosUkrEnergo, to handle Turkmenistan's gas supplies to Ukraine 
ending Kiev's access to an additional supplier.‖238 Moscow also has long-term contracts 
with Kazakhstan that envision the transfer of Kazakh gas via the Russian pipeline 
network. Officially, Moscow is interested in Central Asian energy supplies in order to 
―preserve Russia's northern gas fields for next generations, avoid boosting investment in 
their development, and decrease the pressure on the markets presenting strategic interests 
for Russia itself‖ but it also gives Russia the opportunity to gain control over the Central 
Asian energy market and therefore the possibility to ―dictate prices—especially in 
Europe.‖239  
But Moscow's power already reaches into the European Union. Latvijas 
Gaze, Latvia's gas distribution monopoly, is owned to 34% by Gazprom and to 16% by 
Itera, an independent Russian gas company. Both Russian stakeholders have used their 
power over the Latvian energy market to strengthen their monopoly position. According 
to Chatham House, they managed to delay a governmental decision on alternatives to 
Russian gas and further forced the government to allow the construction of a Gazprom-
owned power plant. In addition, it is feared that Gazprom and Itera might use their 
leverage to influence the political party system since public funding does not exist in 
Latvia.240 This is already threatening to the European Union because it gives Russian 
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state-owned companies like Gazprom the ability to directly influence the political system 
in the EU. Latvia and the other Baltic States joined the EU in 2004. 
It is part of Russia's strategy to ―maximize its economic and geostrategic 
advantages,‖ to ―create customer country dependency through locked energy demands 
and consolidating gas supplies through long-term contracts with Russian state-owned 
producers and pipeline monopolists.‖241 Therefore, Russia's strategy of maximizing its 
influence over large parts of the Central Asian energy market is being perceived as 
dangerous, especially in some European countries and to the European Union as a whole. 
b. Lacking Transparency and the Investment Atmosphere 
The lack of transparency about the true financial situation of Gazprom, 
due to the increased level of corruption and the poor condition of the Russian pipeline 
network, is another reason to worry for international dependent consumers. In addition, 
the relatively slow pace of exploring new gas fields and the restriction on foreign 
investments fuel the discussion that creates an unfavorable investment sphere for 
international investors. 
The state-dominance over Gazprom, which allows room for ―dubious and 
non-transparent practices,‖ is feared by international consumers.242 Moscow uses any 
possible means to further strengthen the power of Gazprom, therefore, also the power of 
the Russian state, and reduces the power of competing companies. The 2006 Law of gas 
exports, which grants Gazprom the monopoly over the very lucrative international 
market, is conceived as a discriminative law in Western democracies. It not only forbids 
external companies from entering the Russian gas market, but also other Russian firms 
from exporting gas, even if the market was large enough for additional competitors.  
Moscow would then lose its control over the energy sector and energy could only be used 
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as a political tool in international relations. Officially, state capitalism has been rejected 
by President Medvedev, but that is the way Moscow behaves, from an external point of 
view.243 
In 2006, Royal Dutch Shell had to sell the majority of its stake in gas 
fields to Gazprom due to environmental breaches. Just after Gazprom's entry, Putin 
announced that the environmental breaches would be legally resolved in conjunction with 
the governmental environmental agency. British Petroleum (BP) had to sell its 62.9% 
stake in an exploration company for an Eastern gas field to Gazprom because it was 
unable to fulfill its production rate. The interesting thing about this incident is that 
Gazprom holds the monopoly over the Russian gas pipeline network and has refused to 
allow BP to connect to it.244 Western companies have no insight into the financial 
situation of Gazprom and several promising deals were called off by Western companies 
because they did not want to ―funnel profits to off-shore accounts or to intermediary 
firms.‖245 RosUkrEnergo, a Ukrainian company largely owned by Gazprom, did hand out 
730 million US dollars as dividends from its 750 million USD earnings in 2005.246 
So far, Western governments and companies have done little to eliminate 
dubious and non-transparent practices within the Russian energy sector, even if they 
present a clear violation of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).247 It might be due to the 
fact that energy is such a profitable market that dubious and non-transparent practices are 
condoned. 
It is also unclear whether Gazprom will be able to fulfill its international 
commitments concerning sufficient gas exports. This is due to rising domestic gas 
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consumption, an aging existing pipeline infrastructure, lack of investments in replacing or 
renovating pipelines, and in the exploration of additional necessary gas fields. 
Already, Russia has to import gas to satisfy its domestic demand and 
international commitments, and both domestic and external consumption are forecast to 
rise significantly. Domestic demand is supposed to rise from 457 bcm in 2008 to 605 bcm 
in 2030. Exports are to increase from 241 bcm to 349 bcm. Even with Russia's forecasted 
production rate of 885 bcm by 2030, the total numbers are not achievable without 
importing additional gas.248 How is Russia going to fulfill its commitments? A rise in the 
domestic gas price and an increase in energy efficiency would contribute to loosening the 
pressure on the gas production, but it will not be sufficient.249  Also, Russia's forecasted 
production rate leaves room for interpretation. The production rates of three major gas 
fields located in Western Siberia are declining. They account for about three-quarters of 
Russia's gas production.250 In addition, Russia faces great difficulties preparing new 
fields for exploration on the Yamal Peninsula and the Barents Sea (Shtokmanovskoye 
field).251 This is mainly due to harsh weather conditions and the unfavorable location of 
the fields. The Shtokmanovskoye field is located 300 miles offshore in the Barents Sea 
and sea depths of more than 300 meters are not uncommon.252 Gazprom does not have 
any experience in deep-sea offshore exploration. The resources are there but they are hard 
to reach and require huge investments. According to the Russian Energy Strategy, 2030 
forecast investments for gas production alone could be as high as 194 billion USD.253 
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Additionally, new production sites have then to be connected to the 
pipeline network to transport the gas to the consumer. The Russian pipeline system is 
largely based on the system that was built under the Soviet regime. Fourteen percent 
needs to be fully replaced or renovated and another 20% have already been in use for 
more than 20 years.254 Up to 289 billion USD are forecasted as a necessary investment in 
the gas transportation sector.255 Pipelines have an unfavorable implication as they depend 
on long-term contracts. Once established, they cannot be moved, meaning that 
diversification of markets cannot be as easily accomplished as with oil that is largely 
being transported via sea, rail or road. LNG would be an option that would allow more 
flexibility of diversification, but the investment costs of LNG terminals are also very 
large and Russia does not see its future in the LNG business. So far, Russia has only built 
one LNG terminal in Sakhalin. It is estimated to reach its full capacity of 90 million tons 
of LNG in 2030. Overall, Russia's share of LNG is not estimated to extend 13 bcm of gas 
per year.256 This equals only one fourth of the transportation rate of the Nord Stream 
pipeline alone. 
Russia's attempts at controlling the Eurasian and Central Asian energy 
sector and defending its pipeline monopoly position, its dubious financial practices, its 
unclear financial situation regarding its true production and transport capabilities do not 
contribute to a strong belief in the Russian energy industry. From an external point of 
view, Russia's energy sector remains questionable. 
C. THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE AND THE KREMLIN 
The Nord Stream pipeline is the latest success story for Gazprom and for Russia. 
With the creation of the pipeline, Russia established a long-term relationship with 
Germany, France and Denmark. The UK will also receive a respective share of the 
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transported gas. All four are very reliable customers with credible forecasted 
consumption rates and strong economies. So far, Russia has been a reliable energy 
supplier to Western Europe and the Nord Stream pipeline will further contribute to its 
reliability and strengthen the relationship. The German-Russian relationship is 
traditionally very strong.257 The demanded amount of gas will be received at the 
contractually agreed upon price. There should not be anything to worry about—or should 
there 
Europe is dependent upon Russian gas and it is wise to create stable connections 
to the largest known reserves in the world, which are in close proximity to Europe, but it 
must be kept in mind that Western European firms are only the junior partners in the 
Nord Stream consortium. Gazprom owns Nord Stream to 51% and Gazprom is owned 
and controlled more than 50% by the Russian government. This alone is, per se, not a bad 
thing, but keeping in mind Russia's past behavior with other customers, this could 
become a problem. 
Because of the distribution of the shares, only Gazprom has the power to make 
any adjustments within the company. This includes direct management influence, but also 
changes in the transportation capacity and prices. The management must ensure the 
profitability of the company; if it cannot be ensured, than such measures might become 
necessary to increase profitability. The European shareholders, representing the 
customer's side, do not have any say in such matters. This gives the Russian government 
the ability to legally exert direct influence on the company, which, as a result, might lead 
to a direct impact on some parts of Europe's industrial sector. ―In the short term, the cost 
of lack of supply is much higher and more dangerous than the cost of lack of payment of 
supply,‖ meaning that importers are always more vulnerable than exporters.258 Energy as 
a means of foreign policy is always applied short term. This possibility has to be kept in 
mind by the ―junior partners‖ of the Nord Stream consortium. 
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Europe needs also to be aware of the fact that they don't have any ability to 
influence the production rates of gas in Russia or control which gas fields are used as the 
supply source for the Nord Stream pipeline. The monopoly for exploiting Russia's gas 
fields for exports, as well as the Russian gas pipeline network belongs to Gazprom. The 
official website of Nord Stream refers to which gas fields will be used to supply sufficient 
gas from Russia to Europe in order to enlarge its transparency, which has been highly 
debated in the past, but this does not imply any guarantees or legal claims.259 If supply 
runs short for any reason, then the demand will have to adapt or will be adapted. This is 
especially worrisome with natural gas because storage facilities are expensive to build 
and are not common.260 
The Kremlin's influence over Gazprom and Nord Stream is also apparent when 
looking at the composition of the management. The Shareholders Committee of Nord 
Stream is chaired by Gerhard Schröder, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. During his term in office, the contract for the creation of the consortium was 
signed. Schröder and Putin, whose relationship has extended into their private lives, were 
both present. Alexei Miller is also a member of the Shareholders Committee. Miller is 
also the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Gazprom and a close friend of Putin. The 
Board of Directors of Gazprom is chaired by Viktor Zubkov, who is also the First Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. His predecessor, Dmitry Medvedev, is now the 
President of the Russian Federation. Putin, who was the President of the Russian 
Federation before him, is now the Prime Minister of Russia. This shows how closely 
interconnected the two companies are and how tight the connection with the Kremlin is. 
No decision within Gazprom, and therefore within Nord Stream, is made without silent 
approval from Moscow. 
The participation of Gazprom in Nord Stream has opened a door for Europe to 
gain access to Russia's gas resources, but it has also opened a door for the Kremlin to 
intervene in European business and perhaps even politics. The energy sector is one of the 
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most important industrial sectors in Europe, and, therefore, mutual dependency between 
the energy sector and politics is assumed to exist. 
The direct connection between Russia and Western Europe has another main 
advantage for Moscow. Russia does not now have to deal with Belarus, the Baltic States, 
the Ukraine and Poland as transit states anymore. ―Supply arrangements that have transit 
states in between the supplier and the consumer are less stable than direct ones.‖261 In 
light of this, the direct connection must be a win-win situation for Russia as the supplier, 
or the European states as the consumers. But who can draw more advantages out of this 
relationship: Europe or Russia? ―Nord Stream is an EU priority energy project and 
important in completing the European energy grid.‖262 But Nord Stream is actually a 
project that divides Europe into two parts. The Western European Union member states 
that profit from the pipeline and the Eastern European Union member states that are left 
out. In fact, Nord Stream is not a pipeline that has been created between Russia and the 
European Union but between Russia and a few member states. Russia prefers to deal with 
EU member states alone because this increases Moscow's potential for price 
discrimination.263 
Sweden, as one state bordering the Baltic Sea, has a very special issue with the 
Nord Stream pipeline and Moscow's influence. The Nord Stream pipeline will cross 
through Sweden's EEZ. This is not a problem per se. What Sweden is worried about is the 
vulnerability and the prominence of the pipeline. This prominence might lead to 
increased attraction for the pipeline by terrorists who could view it as a potential target. 
This, itself, gives reason for concern but Sweden also fears an increased military presence 
by Russia in the Baltic Sea, which could result in a ―source of political friction.‖264 
Sweden also feared that a planned maintenance platform close to the island of Bornholm 
could be used as a sensor platform for intelligence purposes.265 However, Nord Stream 
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decided not to hold on to the construction of a maintenance platform. Sweden's position 
is understandable since Sweden remained neutral during the Cold War and, therefore, 
paid very close attention to the protection of its sphere of interests in the Baltic Sea and 
its territorial waters. It remains to be seen whether Sweden's fear of an increased Russian 
military presence will prove valid. 
The last fact that points out Moscow's control over the pipeline and its political 
leverage is the location of the office and its legal implications. The headquarters of the 
Nord Stream consortium is located in Zug, Switzerland and another office is located in 
Moscow. This implies several advantages for the Kremlin. First, the chosen location in 
Moscow creates an even tighter connection between Russian government officials, 
Gazprom and Nord Stream; Gazprom's headquarters is also located in Moscow. Second, 
picking Switzerland as the location for the main headquarters was a clever move. 
Switzerland is not part of the European Union and hence it does not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the European Union. This accounts for companies registered in 
Switzerland as well. Legal claims by the European shareholders cannot be brought up in 
front of a European court, but have to be addressed in Switzerland. The legal leverage is 
reduced for both sides, but it is unlikely that Gazprom will make use of the Swiss 
jurisdiction anyway. Gazprom already holds all legal rights within the company. 
Switzerland is also well known for its very secretive banking sector. The whole system is 
based on confidentiality. This, of course, makes it difficult for external observers to gain 
an inside view of the financial situation of Nord Stream and could give Gazprom the 
ability to have dubious money transfer operations. This is not to say that Nord Stream is 
nothing but a dummy company for dubious money transfer operations. It is also not the 
intention to discredit the Swiss financial system, By no means! But, it is worth noting that 
RosUkrEnergo, the Ukrainian-Russian gas company, which is considered to be a dummy 
company for Gazprom, is also registered in Switzerland.266 As has already been pointed 
out in previous chapters, RosUkrEnergo attracted some attention in the past due to 
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dubious money transfers.267 The future will show to what extent the critics of Russia's 
influence over the Nord Stream pipeline is right. 
Russia's influence over Nord Stream is immense. This is a fact that Europe, its 
member states, and the involved companies will have to be aware of. Russia's tendency 
towards non-democratic behavior, a legal system that seems to be based more on 
randomness than on the rule of law, and the lack of transparency in the energy sector 
fuels the discussion. So far, Russia has been a very reliable supplier of energy for the EU 
and its member states. What would Russia gain from starting a fight with the EU over 
energy? After all, the EU is the world's largest energy market and promises to be a very 
lucrative market for Russia in the future. And maybe the European Union is not so 
vulnerable after all. The overall fuel mix of the EU, its member states, and its economic 
power all point in the right direction. A concluding assessment of Europe's opportunities 
and risks associated with the pipeline and Russia's influence will be approached in the 
following analysis of this thesis. 
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V. NORD STREAM: IMPACT ON EUROPEAN ENERGY 
SECURITY 
Within the previous chapters, the founding stones have been laid to now further 
continue with the analysis of European energy security and the impact of the Nord 
Stream pipeline. 
The second chapter gave an overall description of the terminology of energy 
security. The key principles of energy security have been presented and described 
followed by a description of the interpretation and implementation of energy security in 
the European context. 
The third part started off with a depiction of Europe's energy situation, divided 
into the external market, Europe's main sources of fossil fuels and overall fuel mix, and 
the internal market, a description of the energy fuel mix of various European countries 
and their priorities in energy security. A nation's priorities do not always coincide with 
European priorities. This situation creates possible challenges for the EU. 
The focus then switched to a short presentation of the Nord Stream pipeline, its 
history and main facts. Because of Russian involvement in the project, a more thorough 
description of Russian energy policies and their external perception was thought 
necessary. The chapter concluded with a description of the involvement of the Russian 
state in the Nord Stream pipeline project. 
It is the goal of this analysis to combine the above-mentioned facts and evaluate 
to what extent the Nord Stream pipeline impacts European energy security. Does the 
pipeline acknowledge the key principles of energy security? What are the positive effects 
for Europe? What are the negative effects for Europe? How is Europe going to outweigh 
these effects? Is Europe's diverse energy fuel mix the solution or the further continuation 
of the internal market, or maybe both? Has the Russian influence over Nord Stream been 
overestimated? Is the Nord Stream pipeline Europe's best option to secure its natural gas 
demand in the future? How dependent is Europe on gas in the long run? 
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To recall, six key principles of energy security have been selected to describe the 
numerous facets of energy security. Of course, energy security is not limited to these 
principles but they present the most important aspects of energy security: diversification, 
resilience, information, reality of integration, globalization of energy security, protection 
of the supply chain.268 
As has been pointed out in Chapter II, the EU has understood the importance of 
the key principles of energy security. This is especially apparent within the Green Paper, 
Europe‘s strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy.269 It has also been 
pointed out that Europe lacks implementation of the key principles of energy security due 
to the particular national interests of its member states. In light of the creation of the Nord 
Stream pipeline, it is now important to evaluate associated opportunities and risks for 
Europe and how Europe will overcome possible negative effects. 
A. IN COMPLIANCE WITH ENERGY SECURITY? OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
EUROPE 
Russia already accounts for 24% of the EU‘s natural gas consumption.270 In 2006, 
Europe‘s share of natural gas energy consumption was 486 bcm.271 In numbers, Russia 
contributes 116 bcm of gas to the European Union. The Nord Stream pipeline, when it 
has reached full capacity with 55 bcm/year in 2013, will increase Russia‘s gas exports to 
the EU by nearly 50%, if actual numbers are stable. But, dependency on imported gas is 
growing and Russia plans on further increasing their export potential of natural gas. The 
pipeline contributes to securing Europe‘s energy needs in the future. It contributes to the 
security of supply. In addition, Russia‘s gas resources are in close proximity to the 
European Union. The only other sources that are closer to the European Union are the gas 
resources of Norway, an additional large exporter of gas to the EU. Through the 
                                                 
268  Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security. 
269  European Commission, Green Paper. 
270  Liuhto, The EU needs a common energy policy—not separate solutions by its member states, 115. 
271  486 bcm equal 437.93 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent): Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport, Europe's energy position: present and future, 7. 
 87 
establishment of the pipeline, the European Union gains access to the largest proven 
reserves of natural gas. In times of growing gas consumption, this seems logical. 
Russia has, so far, been a very reliable supplier of energy towards the European 
Union. The European Union and Russia maintain and continue to further develop a 
special partnership. Currently, the European-Russian cooperation implies four policy 
areas: Freedom, Security and Justice, External Security, and Research & Education. 
Besides this, Russia is the EU‘s third largest trading partner. The existing Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement of 1994 is currently under observation to establish a new 
Cooperation Agreement, which will further extend the European-Russian partnership on 
topics such as political dialogue, economic cooperation, provisions on trade, investment 
and energy, etc.272 
Part of the Cooperation Agreement is also to further support Russia in its efforts 
to further strengthen its own democracy and fight corruption. In comparison to other 
exporters of natural gas to the EU, especially the Arabian nations like Algeria, Libya, and 
Egypt, Russia does not create the impression of being an area threatened by insecurity. In 
fact, the terrorist attack on the Moscow airport in January 2011 did not achieve to 
question the authority of the government. The Arabic states are currently threatened, at 
large, by insecurity, as is the case with Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. This possible 
risk has already been identified by the European Commission in 2006.273 Currently, 
Russia is besides Norway the region, which contains large reserves of natural gas and is 
not threatened by high levels of insecurity. Seen from this perspective, the Nord Stream 
pipeline further contributes to energy security because it provides Europe with additional 
gas and gives Europe the opportunity to divert from areas threatened by insecurity, if 
necessary and applicable. 
Strictly speaking, Nord Stream is not a European project. Nord Stream is a 
consortium consisting of several European energy companies and Gazprom, Russia‘s 
largest gas company. German companies, E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall each 
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own 15.5% of Nord Stream. The German influence, even if all European firms altogether 
do not hold the majority of the shares, should not be underestimated. The reason for this 
is the special relationship between Germany and Russia that started in the 1970s under 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, known as ―Ostpolitik.‖274 And it was also due to the special 
relationship between Chancellor Schröder and President Putin that helped to push the 
negotiation process forward. Some critics say that it is the German-Russian relationship 
that hampers Europe‘s efforts to achieve a common energy policy and promote a greater 
stand against Russia—this aspect will be highlighted in the next chapter—but the strong 
German-Russian relationship can also be an advantage for Europe. 
Germany is the strongest economy in Europe. In 2009, the World Bank ranked 
Germany as the fourth strongest economy in the world measured with 3,330,031 millions 
of USD GDP (gross domestic product), followed by France with 2,649,390 millions of 
USD GDP.275 In 2009, the GDP was actually declining because of the worldwide 
financial crisis beginning in 2008, but the prospects for 2011 are very promising. In 2010 
Germany already achieved a surplus of 3.4% GDP and this trend is likely to continue. 
Germany‘s economic growth is the main driver for the European economy and it resulted 
in an economic growth rate in the EU-27 of 1.8% for 2010, even if several European 
member states still had to suffer from the outcome of the financial crisis, and 2010 also 
has been a very difficult year for the Euro, Europe‘s shared currency.276 Besides 
Germany‘s main contribution to the economic stability of the EU, Germany is also a great 
believer of a combined Europe. ―With a view of establishing a united Europe‖ Germany 
has committed itself to this goal by incorporating it within Article 23 of the 
constitution.277 Germany is considered economically and politically to be the main 
driving force behind the European idea. Therefore, Germany‘s opinion and actions have a 
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considerable amount of weight on European decisions. These facts can contribute to 
creating greater stability concerning Nord Stream and greater interdependence between 
Europe and Russia. If Russia loses Germany‘s support, then Russia has lost its reliability 
towards the rest of Europe. From this perspective, Russia has no incentive to disappoint 
Europe. The stakes are too high for Russia. 
Keeping Europe‘s growing demand for natural gas in mind, it is obvious that new 
pipelines need to be built. Large parts of the existing pipeline structure need to be 
renovated or replaced. The existing pipeline structure will not provide sufficient amounts 
of gas to Europe in the future, and up to this point, the LNG-infrastructure is not 
developed enough to become a real alternative.278  Therefore, it was just a matter of time 
as to when a decision about an additional pipeline connection would have been made. It 
would have been possible to build an additional pipeline alongside the Yamal line, which 
supplies Europe with Russian gas through Belarus, but that would have meant the 
involvement of a third actor, Belarus. ―Supply arrangements with transit states in between 
are less stable than direct ones.‖279 Belarus has already shown, in the past, to be an 
unreliable transit state and has used its negotiation power as a transit state against Russia. 
The advantage of the transit state is that a supply disruption will always be the fault of the 
supplier and damage his image.280 Moscow wants to provide Europe with a guaranteed 
and stable supply of natural gas; therefore the circumvention of transit states eliminates 
this possibility of supply disruptions. The Nord Stream pipeline fulfills these demands 
and can ensure a sufficient supply of gas. 
Nothing is more stable than a pipeline connection. Once established, the gas has 
to flow to cover the expenses. In light of this, Russia must export gas via the Nord Stream 
pipeline in order to compensate its expenses and not lose its credibility in Europe. Europe 
must import the gas to cover its investment expenses through selling the gas to the 
industrial sector and the final consumer.  However, the higher investment burden lies 
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with the exporter and leaves Europe with an advantageous position over Russia when it 
comes to negotiating new prices or conditions.281 
It could be argued that the Nord Stream pipeline creates stability between Russia 
and the European Union because of the increased interdependence. Both are committed to 
the pipeline but the higher investment risk lies with Russia. A pipeline not being used is 
lost investment and Russia has no way to divert the gas flow to other interested customers 
without again taking the risk of large investments. 
Are Russia and Europe equally interdependent? Is Europe through the Nord 
Stream pipeline more dependent on Russia? Or is Russia more dependent on Europe? 
This question remains difficult to answer but it has been shown that the Nord Stream 
pipeline has great potential and can contribute to Europe‘s energy security and increase 
Europe‘s energy opportunities. Europe is not so vulnerable after all, and Nord Stream 
actually increases Europe‘s leverage against Russia. Europe has just to learn how to use 
this leverage effectively to promote its demands. 
B. NORD STREAM AND ASSOCIATED RISKS FOR THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
No pipeline has ever been debated as critically in public as Nord Stream. People 
are concerned about environmental issues, a greater military presence of Russia‘s Navy in 
the Baltic Sea, the lack of transparency of Russia‘s possible political influence, the choice 
of Switzerland for Nord Stream headquarters (outside the European jurisdiction) and the 
fact that Nord Stream is not a true European project because only a few European states 
will profit from it leaving the rest—especially the Eastern European countries like the 
Baltic States and Poland—behind. Nord Stream has been viewed to divide Europe in 
favor of Russian foreign policies. The main critics always led to one aspect: increased 
dependency of Europe on Russia and the fear of Russia using this advantage for its own 
purposes and to promote Russian policies. Nord Stream has often been identified as an 
energy weapon. 
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Are these fears justified? Is Nord Stream nothing but an energy weapon for 
Russia? Does Nord Stream lead inevitably to increased dependency on Russia? What are 
the associated risks and is Europe capable of minimizing these risks? 
Nord Stream has the potential for being used as an energy weapon against Europe. 
If it were used in that way, the consequences would be severe for the European economy. 
Importers are always more vulnerable to short-term supply disruptions than exporters, 
despite the image loss for the exporter.282 The increasing demand for gas in Europe is 
foreseeable, even if Europe manages it to fulfill its goals of 20% reduction of CO2 
emissions, 20% increase of renewables and 20% energy efficiency by 2020.283 Gas will 
even contribute to these goals because it produces less carbon dioxide than coal or oil.284 
An increased demand for gas is a logical step for Europe, but it will also increase 
Europe‘s vulnerability to supply disruptions. 
The consequences of the Nord Stream pipeline being used as an energy weapon 
by Russia would be so severe that Europe could not allow Russia to even consider this 
option as a possibility. In the long run, the credibility of Russia would be destroyed and 
then where but from Russia would Europe receive its gas? The dependency on imported 
gas is too great. Any additional solution would further require a new pipeline or LNG 
terminals, which again would demand huge investments and years of planning and 
building. But Europe does not have the time. Germany has natural gas storage facilities 
with a capacity for 40 days, Austria for 60 days and even Slovakia for 180 days.285  All 
of these storage capacities combined would not be sufficient to satisfy Europe‘s hunger 
for gas and none of these storage facilities belong to the EU but to the individual nations. 
Seen from this perspective, Europe‘s dependency puts Russia in a more favorable 
position for negotiations. Europe has no other choice but to buy gas from Russia. 
                                                 
282  Shaffer, Energy Politics, 39. 
283  European Commission, 20 20 by 2020 - Europe's climate change opportunity. 
284  Christie, European security of gas supply—A new way forward, 5. 
285  Liuhto, The EU Needs A Common Energy Policy—Not Separate Solutions by Its Member States, 
119. 
 92 
The fear that Russia uses energy as a political weapon was fueled by incidents of 
supply disruptions in the Ukraine and Belarus in 2006 and 2009. Also, Russia‘s behavior 
towards its post-soviet neighbors has also been reason for worry. It is feared that Nord 
Stream might be used the same way. In fact, the agreed route of the pipeline has been 
opposed especially by Poland and the Baltic States. Poland even went so far as to call 
Nord Stream ―a new version of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.‖286 Poland sees the 
planned route as a direct slap in the face, not only by Russia and Germany, but also by 
Europe. Nord Stream will transport gas from Russia to Central Europe but not to Poland. 
However, Poland is dependent upon imports of gas as well. If a pipeline had been erected 
along the proposed Amber Track, the Baltic States and Poland would have been able to 
profit from the pipeline as well as Central Europe and the costs would not have been as 
high as for the route through the Baltic Sea. 
Nord Stream is considered a project of European interests. Poland and the Baltic 
States are members of the European Union. Therefore, from a European perspective, their 
proposal should be of interest to the EU. A European project should contribute to the 
wealth and profit for all European member states and not just a few. That is their claim. 
The proposed land route via Poland and the Baltic States would even have solved the 
issue of third actor transit states like Belarus and the Ukraine, which are not members of 
the EU. But the proposal was rejected from the beginning because of higher maintenance 
costs and Russia‘s belief that the Baltic States and Poland would step in as transit states 
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What would be Poland‘s and the Baltic States‘ incentives to charge transit fees to 
the European Union? Actually, a land route via the Baltic States and Poland would have 
increased European energy security because it would have connected European nations 
with each other. They all would then have shared interests about energy policies and 
Russia would not have any leverage against the European Union. But now, even if Nord 
Stream is valued as a project of European interests, it has divided Europe. Central Europe 
will receive its gas through the Nord Stream pipeline and Moscow can now deal with the 
Baltic States and Poland any way it pleases Russia. When Poland gets cut off from 
Russian gas due to differences with Russia, why should the EU or the Central European 
nations step in? After all, they got their gas. And, as has been pointed out before, the 
main drivers for Europe are Germany and France. This being said, without their support it 
is unlikely that the EU will agree on a consensus to call out sanctions against Russia. The 
worst that could happen to Russia is that high-ranking officials of the European Union 
will declare in public that relations between Russia and the EU have been damaged 
severely. The rest of the problems would probably then be solved internally. This does 
not put the European Union in a good bargaining position. 
Without one single cubic meter of gas being transported through Nord Stream, 
Russia has already increased its influence over Europe. It has managed to divide the 
European Union over energy issues and, therefore, enlarged its negotiation power by 
dealing with the member states separately, and this favors Russia. Russia knows that 
Europe‘s economic influence is immense and once a decision is made by the Union, this 
decision will reflect the will of all member states and all member states will then pursue 
the enforcement of such policies. This would be dangerous for Russia, so Russia needs to 
divide the Union over energy issues, Russia‘s biggest export product. Having achieved 
this and being able to deal with the member states separately, Russia can easily 
discriminate prices and charge each country ―its full paying potential.‖288 Up to this 
point, there is little that the Union can do. The EU is dependent on the will of their 
member states. If they are not able to achieve a consensus, than no decision will be made. 
So far, Europe has not been able to implement a common energy policy. 
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Russia‘s price politics and the legal setup of Nord Stream have also contributed to 
the discussion. In contrast to oil, there is no global gas market and no global gas price, 
even if gas prices are linked to the oil price to some extent because the of competition 
between gas and oil as primary energy sources.289 Gas prices vary largely around the 
world. This is owed to the fact that gas cannot get transported as easily as oil. Gas is 
being transported via pipelines creating a direct, stable connection. In light of this, gas 
prices are dependent upon the negotiations between producers and consumers. If gas was 
easier and less costly to transport, then a global market would make sense because it 
would create stability through increased competition. This, in turn, would also result in a 
more transparent and reduced price for gas. A stable market increases energy security, but 
increased competition and, therefore, a stable market is not advantageous for Russia. It 
can be assumed that gas will continue to be a product with great elastic prices, in the 
Nord Stream case, in favor of Russia. 
Nord Stream‘s headquarters location in Switzerland also decreases Europe‘s 
influence and energy security. The EU, the involved member states and companies have 
no legal authority over Nord Stream. This is only true to some extent. Because Nord 
Stream is operating on European ground, the company has to obey European or national 
law. If laws are broken, then the EU has the legal authority to force Nord Stream to 
enforce European law and comply with it. But, if there are financial issues, then the 
power of the EU is very limited. Why did Russia do that? Wasn‘t it one of Russia‘s goals 
to increase transparency? By choosing Switzerland, Gazprom decided not to increase 
transparency. It does not have to happen and there are no obvious signs that it will 
happen, but the pure existence of the possibility of Nord Stream being misused as a 
company for dubious money transfers worries people in Europe and proves critics of 
Russia‘s energy policies right. 
Last but not least, if Sweden and other Baltic States are right about an increased 
military presence of Russia‘s fleet in the Baltic Sea, what would be the consequences for 
Europe? It is natural that Gazprom and the Russian state have a vital interest in observing 
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the functionality of the pipeline. Any gas accident in the Baltic Sea would be severe for 
the eco-system and disastrous for Europe and Russia. To prevent this, the pipeline has to 
be maintained and observed at all times, but, the pipeline might also become an attractive 
target for terrorist attacks, even if it assumed ―that undersea pipelines are less easy to be 
sabotaged than those built on the ground.‖290 The sole possibility of a potential threat 
against Nord Stream—it would hurt Russia as well as Europe—would be reason enough 
for Russia to provide special military assets for protection. The protection of the pipeline 
is important and necessary but how can Europe and the adjacent Baltic States be ensured 
that an increased military presence in the Baltic Sea might not be used for surveillance or 
reconnaissance missions? This is Sweden‘s main fear, as was pointed out in Larsson‘s 
report on Nord Stream and Baltic Sea Security.291 For Poland, an increased presence of 
Russian military might have a more serious outcome. 
In 2009 Russia carried out a military exercise in conjunction with Belarus that 
simulated a nuclear attack on Poland. The exercise coincided with the 70
th
 anniversary of 
the Soviet invasion of Poland and was regarded as a threat by Poland. As a direct answer 
to the exercise, ―Central and Eastern Europeans have warned of Russia adopting a neo-
imperialistic attitude to an area of the world it still regards as its sphere of influence.‖292 
Storming a ―Polish‖ beach and an attack on a pipeline were also part of the exercise. Can 
this exercise be linked to Nord Stream? Such a linkage could only be based on very 
vague assumptions, but it shows Russia‘s attitude of being perceived as a world power. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Polish-Russian relations have not been the best and 
Poland‘s decision to join NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004 have not 
contributed to an improvement in their relationship. Poland joined both organizations to 
open up even more towards western democracy, but also to take cover under the 
protective shield against Russia. Poland does not trust Russia and the fact that through 
Nord Stream it is even more dependent on Russia, increased Poland‘s mistrust in Russia 
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even further. Would a Russian attack on Poland or the Baltic States be likely? No, but the 
pure demonstration of Russia‘s military power, capabilities and effectiveness speak for 
themselves. Poland would welcome a stronger European military presence in the Baltic 
Sea, but Europe‘s military options are very limited. 
The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was introduced in 1999 and 
since then, the EU has conducted eight military operations outside of Europe.293 But 
Europe does not have its own troops. All decisions concerning CSDP missions are based 
on unanimity within the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council. It is up to the 
member states if and to what extent military forces will be provided for EU-led missions. 
A EU-led mission in the Baltic Sea to maintain the balance between Russian and 
European forces, and to send a signal to Poland and the Baltic States that they have 
support from the EU, is very unlikely due to German-Russian and French-Russian 
relations. As has been pointed out before, a decision within the EU without approval of 
France and Germany is very unlikely. 
Does this mean that no presence of EU forces in the Baltic Sea weakens Europe? 
Not necessarily, but the complicated decision-making process for CSDP missions 
hampers Europe‘s abilities to put more pressure on Russia and to clearly draw the line 
that is not to be crossed by Russia. The main problem with CSDP missions is similar to 
Europe‘s inability to establish a common energy security policy: Europe needs to speak 
with a common voice! ―The necessity to speak with a common voice on the international 
scene on energy-related matters may have wider policy implications which need to be 
coordinated with Europe‘s existing foreign policies [including CSDP].‖294 
C. OPPORTUNITIES VS. RISKS: IMPACTS ON EUROPE 
As has been previously shown, Nord Stream is a blessing and a curse for Europe 
at the same time. Strong arguments have been presented that are in favor of Nord Stream 
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and Europe‘s possibilities to reduce Russia‘s influence. On the other hand, there are also 
strong arguments that clearly show that through Nord Stream, Russia has an 
advantageous position over Europe concerning energy security. Do the positive aspects of 
Nord Stream outweigh the associated risks? That depends on the perspective. Both, 
negative and positive aspects contribute to energy security either way and reflect its key 
principles. 
On the one hand, Nord Stream contributes to greater diversification because 
Europe will gain access to large amounts of reserves of natural gas and Nord Stream 
allows Russia to supply gas to Europe without the negative impact of transit states as 
third actors. It also allows Europe to diverse its gas imports from areas threatened by 
insecurity, as is currently the case in the Arabic states of the Mediterranean. On the other 
hand, Europe‘s dependency on Russia grows through Nord Stream, and diversification 
also envisages a decrease of dependency and an increase in the number of resources 
providers. But, natural gas is a limited resource and it is only located in a few nations 
worldwide. So, concerning the diversification of suppliers, Europe does not have many 
options. A greater diversification of the fuel mix, as is aspired to by the Union, is 
difficult, and will not be achieved overnight. In the long run, this will become more and 
more important for the EU, but it will not solve the short-term requirements of the 
growing energy demand in Europe. 
Resilience is difficult to achieve concerning gas. Natural gas can only be 
transported via pipelines and through LNG terminals, and it is difficult and costly to 
store. The current storage facilities in Europe are scarce and their existence is due to 
national backup planning. Nord Stream‘s contribution to resilience is the amount of gas 
that is within the pipeline. An expansion of the number of storage facilities in Europe 
would be desirable, but cannot be attached to the purpose of Nord Stream. 
Information is a very sensitive issue linked to the pipeline. In today‘s 
interconnected electronic world, information can be obtained in real time by everyone 
who has access. This includes the fast spread of information before it can get evaluated 
and confirmed. This puts pressure on Nord Stream because in order to contradict negative 
arguments against the pipeline, the company has to go public and respond to accusations 
 98 
with an official statement. In light of this, Nord Stream is also a bad example of 
information transparency because the non-transparent Russian energy market aligned 
with dubious money transfers and the headquarters‘ location in Switzerland does not 
fulfill the demand for more information. It actually underlines information as a key 
principle. 
Russia and Europe are well aware of the impact of the reality of integration.  
Nothing can create more dependency between importers and exporters than a pipeline. 
Both partners know that through Nord Stream, their mutual dependency has grown but 
the nature of gas pipelines and the great price differences worldwide have also shown that 
the creation of a stable gas market is still to be achieved. And Russia, as the exporter, 
profits from this situation since it gives it the ability to discriminate its prices.  
Nord Stream puts Europe in a more favorable position for competing for energy 
resources than China. China is the largest growing economy and its increasing demand 
for energy is equivalent. Through Nord Stream, it is assured that gas will flow from 
Russia to Europe. Pipeline connections to China have still to be built. Europe can use this 
advantage to promote its vision of the future of energy security and energy markets and  
the important conclusion that energy security has already become a global issue. 
Intermediate solutions, consisting of a limited number of states, are not an option and 
would threaten to destabilize a global energy security system, if it was achieved. But 
Nord Stream is also a valid example of a non-global intermediate solution. Nord Stream 
is not a European project, per se, even if it does have the support of the EU. Nord Stream 
has been made possible through negotiations between Russia and respective European 
states, especially Germany. How can Europe promote the importance of global energy 
security when the Union can so easily be divided into two camps representing different 
opinions about European energy security by just one pipeline? Europe has to realize that 
if the EU wants to be perceived as a major player concerning energy security, it has to act 
accordingly and speak with one voice. This is the globalization of energy security on a 
small scale. 
Protection of the supply chain is becoming more and more important for Western 
democracies since terrorists have realized that energy is the most vulnerable side of 
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democracies.295 If supply is interrupted, the consequences are severe. Nord Stream itself 
has a great advantage due to the fact that it lies on the bottom of the Baltic Sea down to a 
depth of 210 meters.296 This is difficult to sabotage. The upstream connection lies within 
Russia and falls, therefore, under its supervision, whereas downstream it falls under the 
supervision of Germany. The fear is that just the possibility of a terrorist attack might 
result in an increase of Russian military presence in the Baltic Sea. Russia perceives it as 
its responsibility to care for the protection of the pipeline because it is mainly a Russian 
company and represents Russian interests. Nord Stream passes through the EEZ of 
Finland and Sweden, but not through their territorial waters. According to maritime law, 
Nord Stream lies in open waters, therefore, no one can forbid Russia to place military 
assets along the route if needed. On the other hand, any other nation could do the same. 
This poses a problem. A stronger stand by Europe concerning CSDP might be helpful 
because it would support Poland and Sweden‘s points of view and could contribute to 
more stability in the Baltic Sea. Currently, an increase of Russia‘s military forces in the 
Baltic Sea would be perceived as a threat by adjacent Baltic States. Even if Russia sends 
out forces solely for the purpose of protecting Nord Stream, there is the possibility that 
Russia would misuse its protection mandate. This does not contribute to the protection of 
the supply chain. 
Is Europe helpless against Russia and its imperialistic behavior concerning 
energy? No, it is not! Maybe the EU is a bit naive toward Russia and its intentions 
concerning the negative influence potential Nord Stream might posses. Both Russia and 
Europe are mutually dependent and Nord Stream underlines this fact. Europe needs gas 
from reliable suppliers and Russia needs reliable customers. So far, Russia has never 
disappointed the EU concerning energy supply. This trend may continue, but Europe also 
needs to be aware of the fact that through Nord Stream, Russia‘s potential to directly 
influence Europe‘s industry and politics has increased. Europe must find ways to 
outweigh the potential risks that are associated with Nord Stream, reduce Russia‘s 
influence, and increase Europe‘s negotiation abilities. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is expected that the first gas will travel through Nord Stream from Russia to 
Europe in late 2011. Its full capacity of 55 bcm/year is to be reached in 2012. The most 
controversial pipeline being discussed in public has become reality. Now the gas must 
flow. 
The discussion about a possible construction of the pipeline has come to an end. 
This is the reality that the European Union now has to face. In order to reduce associated 
risks to a minimum and to maximize its possibilities, the EU needs to bring energy 
security to a new level, a level that will endow the EU with the necessary capabilities. 
In accordance with the policy proposal of the European Commission to the 
European Council and the European Parliament in 2007, a common energy policy for 
Europe is essential. The key elements of the proposal focus on sustainability, security of 
supply, competitiveness, an internal energy market with the necessary infrastructure, 
solidarity between member states, increased energy efficiency, greenhouse gas reduction, 
increased amount of renewables, and an increase of the external dimension of European 
energy security.297 So far, a common energy policy has not been realized, even if some 
achievements have been made, like Europe‘s goal of 20 20 by 2020. A common energy 
policy would decrease the member states‘ individual influence over their respective 
energy sectors. Energy is mainly driven by national motives, but this is what Europe has 
to overcome, its divergence of national interests. 
If Europe is able to implement a common energy policy with an external 
dimension and learns to speak with one voice, it will increase its negotiation abilities with 
suppliers. Energy security is closely interlinked with foreign affairs. Combined actions 
concerning the energy security of the European Commissioner of Energy and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Security Policy of the European Union linked 
with the power to speak for the Union as a whole, would underline this fact. Through the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has endowed itself with a ―foreign 
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affairs minister.‖ Now the EU should make adequate use of this office and provide the 
High Representative with the necessary instruments. An implementation of energy 
security as a major topic within CFSP seems logical and is inevitable. 
According to Andoura et al. from Notre Europe, ―Europe‘s current energy rules 
and policy suffer from structural deficiencies.‖298 Within their study, the authors have 
identified several essential requirements a common European energy policy should 
possess: an internal energy market, an integrated and smart network that supports 
sustainability and security of supply, price stabilization, a diversified fuel mix, crisis 
management and strategic reserves and an external dimension that ―allows Europe to 
protect and secure its goals on the international scene.‖299 
Kari Liuhto from the Pan-European Institute comes to a similar conclusion. A 
common energy policy is essential for Europe, not separate solutions by the member 
states. In addition to the demand for a common energy policy, Liuhto stresses the 
importance of energy efficiency, diversification, individual energy production, storage 
capabilities and a reliable partnership with Russia.300 All of them would assist in 
decreasing Russia‘s influence over Europe.  
The EU itself as a supranational organization possesses only the power that has 
been granted by the member states, where the real power is located. European politics are 
only made, to some extent, in Brussels. But to a larger degree, European politics depend 
on the opinions in the national capitals with Paris, London and Berlin being the most 
influential ones. The European decision-making process is based, to a large degree, on a 
consensus between the member states, and no nation is willing to give up parts of its 
sovereignty freely. However, in the case of energy security, this might be a difficult but 
necessary step to take. 
A further advance in the development of an internal energy market in the EU 
would make the EU less vulnerable. Fossil resources and electricity can be traded 
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between the member states if an adequate infrastructure is available. This will require 
large investments to update the current energy infrastructure, but in the long run, it will 
contribute to sustainability, security of supply and price stabilization. 
Europe must continue to develop its fuel mix. A reduction of fossil resources like 
gas could be achieved through an increase of the EU‘s own energy production. Since 
Europe‘s fossil resources are declining, this calls for an increase of renewables. They will 
provide additional support for the European fuel mix, but are not capable of providing the 
essential energy base load at the moment. Therefore, it is important to further promote 
R&D (Research and Development) for renewables in order to increase their efficiency 
and reliability. A European-led approach would increase transparency between the 
member states and decrease development costs. In addition, even if nuclear energy is not 
very popular in large parts of Europe, nuclear energy power generation should also be 
reconsidered by the EU. With nuclear power, the EU would be able to generate sufficient 
amounts of energy for its citizens and industry and decrease the dependency of energy 
imports from Russia in particular. 
Concerning gas, it is essential for the EU to decrease its dependency on imports. 
Natural gas is the most popular fossil resource for power generation in the EU. It 
produces less carbon dioxide than oil or coal power plants and, therefore, contributes to 
Europe‘s goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by the year 2020. Natural 
gas is also more favorable for power generation than nuclear power plants are because of 
the risks associated with nuclear energy. But, all of these arguments lead to an increase in 
the importation of natural gas. Besides pipelines, Europe should invest in LNG terminals 
to be able to diversify its gas imports on relatively short notice. This increases Europe‘s 
negotiation capabilities, reduces the possibility of price discrimination and contributes to 
more transparency in the gas market. Eventually this might also lead to a valid gas price, 
worldwide. 
Europe should also increase its natural gas storage capabilities, and they should be 
perceived as European strategic reserves rather than national reserves. This would limit 
the severity of the impact of a sudden disruption of supply. It would also support 
Europe‘s external dimension of energy security because the option of divide-and-rule 
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would be limited.  Natural gas, especially, is known to create long-term dependencies 
between consumers and producers due to limited transport possibilities. A disruption of 
the supply of gas to Poland would have severe consequences for Poland but not for 
Germany or other European nations. If Europe could have natural gas reserves available 
and the necessary infrastructure to distribute energy between the EU‘s member states in 
times of need, the leverage of the supplier on its consumer is largely reduced. 
Europe‘s plans to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020, in accordance with 
the EU‘s 20 20 by 2020 goals, also help to decrease import dependency. In fact, if Europe 
is able to implement these goals by 2020, then energy consumption is expected to decline 
in some circumstances.301 This would be harmful for Russia as Europe‘s largest gas 
supplier, because Russia depends on the amount of gas sold to the EU. According to the 
basic principles of supply and demand, a demand decrease will lead to a lower agreed 
price. 
None of the above-mentioned mechanisms are new. They all reflect the key 
principles of energy security. The problem with the EU is that it does not have the 
political will to implement these mechanisms that would help decrease Europe‘s 
dependency on imported fossil fuels, especially gas from Russia. This has also been 
pointed out by Günther Oettinger, the EU Commissioner for Energy, during a speech at 
Kings College on the 10th
 
of February 2011. ―At the moment we [the EU] lack the 
permanent mechanisms to ensure effective coordination at the EU and Member States 
level. This makes us far less effective in dealing with our partners.‖302 
According to that speech, the European Commission has been working on a new 
policy proposal for a new energy strategy. It has already been endorsed by the European 
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Council but has not yet entered the European Union decision-making process. This is 
expected to occur during the summer of 2011.303 
Maybe the new policy proposal will contribute to a Common European Energy 
Policy. And maybe it will further strengthen Europe‘s most powerful tool: to speak with 
one voice! 
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